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Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2102 (2013), in which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed of the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and to provide an assessment of the political and security implications of wider United Nations deployments across Somalia every 90 days. The present report covers major developments that occurred during the period from 16 November 2013 to 15 February 2014.

II. Political and security developments

A. Political situation

2. The political landscape in Somalia was dominated by the formation of a new cabinet, with regional political processes showing promising signs. Indirect elections in Puntland State of Somalia led to the selection of a new President. In addition, the inauguration of the Interim Juba Administration, witnessed by the international community, and the holding of talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and "Somaliland" were positive steps forward.

3. On 2 December 2013, Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon lost a no confidence motion in the Somali Federal Parliament. On 12 December, following extensive consultations, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud nominated Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed as the new Prime Minister. He was endorsed by the Parliament on 21 December, and on 17 January, Mr. Ahmed announced the formation of his expanded cabinet composed of 25 members, including 2 women.

4. Elsewhere, on 8 January, the Parliament of Puntland elected Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas President for a five-year term. Incumbent President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, who lost by one vote, gracefully conceded defeat, characterizing the election as "clean and democratic" and expressing his support to Mr. Gaas, who later became the fifth President of Puntland. The electoral process had begun in December with the selection of the members of parliament by the region's traditional leaders, who were then vetted by a Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation Committee. The Committee announced a list of the 66 members of

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parliament out of 160 nominees on 30 December. Only 2 out of the 66 members of parliament are women. They were sworn in on 1 January.

5. On 17 December, in Baidoa, Somali traditional leaders, intellectuals and politicians launched the second phase of "the Baidoa Conference" aimed at the formation of a new federal State comprising six regions, namely, Bay, Bakool, Juba Hoose, Juba Dhexe, Shabelle Dhexe and Gedo. During the last week of January, the Baidoa Conference moved closer to the declaration of a federal State by adopting a Constitution and a flag, as well as the swearing in of a House of Elders, the upper house of a two-chamber Parliament. At the request of various individuals, including the Speaker of the Federal Parliament, the Baidoa Conference agreed to temporarily suspend the election of a "President". A competing three-region federal State initiative, championed by the previous Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, intensified its activities in the first week of February, adopting its own flag and establishing a constitutional committee and making plans for a formal conference.

6. Progress was made towards the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement on the Interim Juba Administration. On 7 December, the Interim Juba Administration announced the appointment of eight Ministers and a second Deputy Leader. On 20 January, the administration was formally inaugurated in Kismaayo in a ceremony attended by international partners. Meanwhile, tension rose between the Interim Juba Administration and the Barre Hirale militia based outside Kismaayo. The Interim Juba Administration accused the militia of having attacked the residence of a Minister in Kismaayo on 26 December.

7. On 28 and 29 January, the Galmudug, and Himan and Heeb administrations held a conference in Gaalkacyo, where they agreed to continue their initiative to form a federal State through a reconciliation process.

8. In "Somaliland", relations between the Government and the opposition deteriorated. The Justice and Welfare Party claimed it had been denied freedom of movement and permission to hold peaceful demonstrations against the Government. Meanwhile, Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi "Irro", Speaker of the "Somaliland" House of Representatives and Chair of Wadani (opposition party), announced his support for the holding of a national dialogue conference as called for by the opposition parties. On 18 December, talks held between "Somaliland" President Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo and Speaker Irro resulted in an agreement on the holding of a conference, provided that a neutral party would chair it.

9. From 16 to 19 January, a third round of talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and "Somaliland" was hosted by Turkey in Istanbul. The two delegations adopted a communiqué, establishing a joint secretariat in Turkey to institutionalize the process and agreeing that talks should take place every 90 days. Furthermore, the communiqué provided for the establishment of a joint air traffic control board. It also condemned the "atrocities committed" by the former Siad Barre regime, "particularly" in "Somaliland".

B. Security situation

10. The security situation in Mogadishu remained volatile. Al-Shabaab continued to use both guerrilla and terrorist tactics, which often resulted in civilian casualties,

to undermine the Federal Government of Somalia and intimidate international partners. Armed attacks against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army took place almost weekly. In the outer districts of Mogadishu, small-scale attacks, particularly targeted assassinations, occurred almost daily. Some violence is likely to be criminal or clan related.

11. Three justice officials were murdered on 23 and 30 November, while a member of parliament was killed by a car bomb outside Villa Somalia on 6 December. On 1 January, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a coordinated suicide car bombing that killed at least 12 people and injured several others at the Jazeera Hotel.

12. Separately, on 1 January, six shells fired from positions north of the Mogadishu International Airport landed inside various sites of the AMISOM protected area causing minimal damage. In February, a series of mortar attacks took place in Mogadishu. On 10 February, a car bomb targeted a meeting at the Oriental Hotel, killing two and injuring five. On 13 February, a United Nations convoy was attacked by a suicide car bomber while approaching the Mogadishu International Airport. Several Somali bystanders were killed. No United Nations staff were injured. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.

13. In southern and central Somalia, periodic clashes occurred between Al-Shabaab and the Somali National Army, who was supported by AMISOM, the Ethiopian National Defence Force, and pro-Government militias in the Bay and Gedo regions, particularly in and around Baidoa, Qansaxdheere, Gofgadud, Awdinle, Faxfaxdhuun and Garbahaarey. On 8 January, an airstrike by Kenya Defence Force jets reportedly killed eight Al-Shabaab insurgents near Garbaraahey. Fewer incidents were reported in Bakool, which remains almost entirely under the control of Al-Shabaab.

14. Kismaayo remained unstable owing to continued activities of Al-Shabaab and sporadic outbursts of violence between rogue forces of the Interim Juba Administration and clan militias. On 5 December, the convoy of the Interim Juba Administration President, Mr. Ahmed Madobe, was hit by a roadside bomb, resulting in one casualty. AMISOM forces faced repeated probing attacks in other areas of Juba Hoose, particularly in Afmadow, and along the Taabta-Dhobley road.

15. In Shabelle Hoose, Al-Shabaab launched almost daily attacks against AMISOM and Somali military targets. On 15 January, Al-Shabaab launched an ultimately unsuccessful attack on positions of the Somali National Army in Burane and Mahadday Weym. On 26 January, an unmanned drone hit an Al-Shabaab convoy in the Baraawe district, reportedly killing a senior commander. The situation deteriorated with renewed inter-clan rivalries. A clash between the Biyo Mal and Habargidir clan militias on 16 November triggered a series of retaliatory incidents in the Afgooye and Marka districts, resulting in over 20 fatalities and additional injuries. There were also sporadic clashes between the Abgal and Shidle communities in the Jawhar district, Shabelle Dhexe, in late November. However, a ceasefire mediated by local clan elders and the Federal Government of Somalia with local representatives ended the hostilities in early December.

16. Galguduud remained quiet, whereas the security situation in Hiraan deteriorated. On 19 November, Al-Shabaab insurgents carried out a complex attack against the central police station in Beledweyne, in which 24 Somali police officers

and one AMISOM soldier were killed, and several others were injured. Following the attack, AMISOM forces conducted extensive operations, recovering villages in the outskirts of Beledweyne, but continued to face attacks by Al-Shabaab.

17. Puntland experienced renewed Al-Shabaab activities. On 5 December, an Al-Shabaab suicide car bomber hit a convoy of the Puntland security forces in central Boosaaso, killing three police officers and four civilians, while injuring several others. In early January, Al-Shabaab carried out four raids against police checkpoints outside Boosaaso. On 21 January, two roadside explosions in Gaalkacyo killed three civilians and injured 13 others. However, the elections in Puntland were held without major security incidents. In Sool, clashes were reported in Taleh on 28 November between armed men from the Dhulbahante clan and Puntland forces. Those clashes reportedly resulted in the killing of 12 people, including 11 civilians, and injury to several others. On 26 January, the Puntland Government announced that it had recovered ammunition, explosive devices and other equipment from Al-Shabaab hideouts following an assault on the group's base in Galgala near the Golis Mountain range.

18. "Somaliland" was relatively calm. Isolated armed clashes were reported in the disputed Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn regions on 27 and 28 November. Tension was high in early December following reports of a military build-up along the border between "Somaliland" and Puntland, but no further incidents were reported.

III. United Nations support to peace consolidation

A. Good offices and political support

19. During the reporting period, my Special Representative for Somalia and Head of UNSOM, Nicholas Kay, continued to avail himself of his good offices role to help address a number of domestic and international challenges.

20. In Puntland, my Special Representative and his team played a critical role in ensuring that the electoral process was inclusive, transparent and peaceful. They worked closely with all stakeholders to ensure that key electoral mechanisms were credible. Also working closely with international partners, Mr. Kay effectively led the efforts to regularly engage with candidates and stakeholders, mediate and encourage them to campaign responsibly. He visited Puntland between 20 to 22 November and from 7 to 9 January to follow the indirect presidential election. Subsequently, the new President and the members of parliament were called on to resume relations with the Federal Government of Somalia and to work on advancing federalism in Somalia. He stressed the importance of resuming the suspended democratization process in Puntland, as the recent elections were based on a traditional system, and called for the enhancement of women's role in government and public life.

21. On 26 November, my Special Representative held discussions with the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners following the resignation of the Governor of the Central Bank. Participants agreed on the appointment of an interim Central Bank Governor and ways to strengthen the public finance management capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia.

22. My Special Representative also visited Beledweyne, Hiraan, on 14 December, where he urged the local authorities, elders, civil society organizations and women's representatives to resolve clan disputes. After the outbreak of violence in the Sool region on 27 November, he stressed the fact that political differences and competing claims should be resolved through dialogue.

23. On 5 December, my Deputy Special Representative, Fatiha Serour, led a delegation of international partners to Kismaayo. The team held consultations with Ahmed Madobe, leader of the Interim Juba Administration, on progress made in the reconciliation process and on the integration of forces and security, among other issues. On 5 February, she again met Mr. Madobe and the Interim Juba Administration leadership in Kismaayo to discuss a range of issues, including the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement.

B. Support to peacebuilding and State-building

24. Implementation of the New Deal Somalia Compact and its peacebuilding and State-building goals has gained momentum. The establishment of the United Nations multi-partner trust fund has been completed.

Peacebuilding and State-building goal 1: development of a federal system and constitutional review

25. The United Nations continued to assist the Federal Government of Somalia with the provision of technical advice on the formation of the Federal Member States. On 21 November, UNSOM provided the Federal Government of Somalia with an options paper on State formation, including confidence-building measures. Upon the request of the Presidency, UNSOM helped the Federal Government of Somalia in the drafting of a consultative discussion paper on State formation to help guide regional dialogue. The President also requested technical briefings on federalism for senior government officials and presidential advisers.

26. Also at the political level and during the period of the parliamentary vote of no confidence on former Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon, my Special Representative undertook consultations with the President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament towards an amicable resolution of the deadlock and also consulted with senior political leaders on initiatives to better delineate the roles and responsibilities of the offices of the President and Prime Minister, in accordance with the terms of the Provisional Constitution. That engagement highlighted the importance of rapidly establishing the Judicial Services Commission and of rebuilding a qualified judiciary with the capacity to interpret the Provisional Constitution.

27. UNSOM is facilitating the coordination of international support for constitutional activities as defined in the first peacebuilding and State-building goal of the Somali Compact. On 21 January, UNSOM provided a briefing at a donors' meeting in Nairobi on the plans of the United Nations to coordinate constitutional support. UNSOM and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also continued to provide support to the Federal Parliament on the nationwide dialogue on constitutional issues. Furthermore, UNSOM and UNDP are providing technical and logistical support for civic education activities and advice on the formation of

the Independent Constitutional Review Commission and the Judicial Reform Commission, which are stated priorities for the new Government.

28. On 27 January, a Senior Electoral Adviser was deployed to facilitate discussions and provide advice for the drafting of a law to establish the National Independent Electoral Commission, one of the key recommendations of the United Nations needs assessment mission that was deployed in November.

29. In support of the Compact and the Economic Recovery Plan, UNDP and the World Bank, in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia and other stakeholders, have been formulating options for a joint programme aimed at developing institutional capacity. This entails a number of assessments and "due diligence" in civil service management, human resources management, "core of government" functionalities and a modality for capacity injection. The main objective is to establish a sound baseline and reach an understanding on cooperation and support modalities.

Peacebuilding and State-building goal 2: security sector

Defence

30. The Aid Coordination Unit of the Federal Government of Somalia submitted the terms of reference for the Working Group on peacebuilding and State-building goal 2 to the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility on 3 February for approval, indicating the National Security Adviser as chairperson, with UNSOM providing secretariat support. UNSOM also assisted the National Security Adviser with developing the work processes, personnel structure and office of the secretariat of the Somali National Security Council. On 4 December, the National Security Adviser convened the first meeting of the Human Resources System Steering Committee, which aims at rationalizing the processing and procedures related to salary and stipends across the Somali security institutions. On 21 and 22 January, UNSOM and UNDP facilitated the holding of a workshop on arms and ammunition management, which provided guidance and support to the Federal Government of Somalia prior to the submission of its six-month report to the Sanctions Committee on 6 February. Meanwhile, agreement was reached between UNSOM and the World Bank on 12 December to jointly conduct a review of security sector reform public expenditure in the first half of 2014.

31. The Commanders of the Somali Air Force and the Navy/Coast Guard joined the Defence Working Group, thereby extending security sector reform to those components of the Somali National Army. The Defence Working Group continued to organize a series of sub-working groups, including the newly established Defence Policy Working Group led by the Ministry of Defence.

Disengaging fighters

32. On 12 December, the Serendi Rehabilitation Centre for disengaged combatants in Mogadishu opened a wing for children. On 10 January, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) started providing support to the Federal Government of Somalia for existing disengaged combatant caseloads in Baidoa, some of which will be transferred to a new Transition Centre being rehabilitated by the Federal Government of Somalia and local authorities. UNSOM also conducted assessment missions to Kismaayo from 23 to 26 December and on 13 January to

support the Federal Government of Somalia in establishing a transition facility for disengaging combatants in coordination with the Interim Juba Administration and AMISOM.

Police

33. The capacity of the Somali police force has been enhanced through timely stipend payments, training and harmonized mechanisms with the support of the United Nations, AMISOM and other international partners. A strategic planning team was established in the Somali police force, through the rule of law bridging and inception project funds, to oversee the implementation of the strategic action plan for policing of the Ministry of Interior and National Security and the Somali police force.

34. The Somali police force has increased its workforce by 625 officers to meet the demands of operations in the newly recovered areas, bringing their total number in the south central Somalia to 5,711. The construction and rehabilitation of 23 police facilities continued in south-central Somalia and Puntland. With contributions from the Government of Japan to the Trust Fund in Support of Somali Transitional Security Institutions, UNSOM distributed furniture and office equipment for 10 police stations and the headquarters of the Somali police force on 9 February.

35. UNSOM supported the Somali police force in the development of its 2014 workplan, which addresses the urgent capacity-building and reform needs of the force. With United Nations technical and financial support, current police reform measures in "Somaliland" include the review and development of policies in the areas of special police unit payments, provision of advice on model police stations, establishment of a joint committee to develop a Police Act for "Somaliland" police, recruitment of 40 female police personnel, and construction of two model police stations.

36. UNSOM organized site visits to Kismaayo, Baidoa and Beledweyne together with the Somali police force, AMISOM police, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to identify urgent operational and logistical requirements, infrastructure rehabilitation needs and possible alternative training facilities to start the basic training programmes for 2,000 new recruits envisaged in the Somali police force workplan for 2014.

Maritime security

37. Incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia have decreased, owing largely to effective self-protection by vessels, coordinated naval action at sea, and prosecution and imprisonment of individuals suspected of piracy. However, this positive trend remains reversible in the absence of sustainable infrastructure and development of the maritime security apparatus in Somalia.

38. The Federal Government of Somalia has agreed to establish a maritime security architecture within the Somali National Security Council to create linkages between various maritime focused forums across all activities related to the Peacebuilding and State-building Goals. A Maritime Steering Committee, including relevant ministries of the Federal Government of Somalia and representatives from

the international community, will provide for enhanced coordination across all thematic areas articulated in the Somali maritime resource and security strategy.

Mine action

39. UNMAS continued its engagement with the Somali Explosive Management Authority to address explosives contamination throughout Somalia. During the reporting period, the explosive ordnance disposal teams of the Somali police force, trained by UNMAS, responded to 19 confirmed incidents involving improvised explosive devices and cleared 247 items of unexploded ordnance. The teams have the capacity to deploy to Marka, Wanlaweyn, Jawhar and Afgooye. Training for additional Somali ordnance disposal units, which will deploy to Beledweyne in the next quarter, was also completed. UNSOM cleared 2,627 items of unexploded ordnance and provided training for 69,657 people about the risks posed by such ordnance. AMISOM teams safely destroyed 2,418 items of unexploded ordnance and 21 improvised explosive devices across southern and central Somalia.

40. UNMAS continued to work with the Somali police force on developing safe and secure ammunition storage facilities, and building armouries in Beledweyne, the police headquarters and at Mogadishu Central Prison, while also leading the Technical Working Group on Weapons and Ammunition Management.

Peacebuilding and State-building goal 3: justice

41. A judicial security assessment and a plan for responses, supported by the United Nations, were finalized on 23 January. As security of judges was identified as a top priority, the United Nations continued to encourage the establishment of a Police Protection Unit.

42. The Justice and Corrections Steering Committee, supported by the United Nations, held its inaugural meeting on 24 November, including representatives from donors and other international partners. Co-chaired by the Chief Justice and the Minister of Justice, the discussion focused on the continued concern over the security of the judiciary.

43. One of the most urgent issues in the justice sector is to find a short-term solution to hold trials involving high-risk cases, including those involving Al-Shabaab, pending the completion of the Mogadishu Major Crimes Complex, which is funded by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Challenging security concerns for the safety of the judiciary, prosecutors, lawyers and legal system staff and a lack of capacity hamper possible solutions.

44. On 19 December, the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary, the United Nations and the International Development Law Organization launched a new six-month rule of law project, funded by the European Union, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for the establishment of the Judicial Services Commission and a Legal Policy and Drafting Unit in the Ministry of Justice.

45. UNSOM and UNDP facilitated two courses on 30 November and 4 January to train Somali custodial corps officers on the human resources registration system. They also completed the registration of and started producing biometric identification cards for those officers. From 9 to 12 January, UNSOM and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime facilitated training for senior officers on the treatment of prisoners, as well as on safety and security in prisons. The

refurbishment of the Mogadishu Central Prison, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), commenced on 1 February.

C. Human rights and protection

Human rights

46. The United Nations worked closely with AMISOM and the Federal Government of Somalia on the implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy in Somalia. This included the development of a joint strategy and the establishment of a working group as provided for in the revised Concept of Operations for AMISOM (see para. 74 below). UNSOM continued to provide predeployment induction training to AMISOM contingents, as well as to the Somali National Army. Efforts were also under way to undertake risk assessment for both AMISOM and the Somali National Army in order to identify mitigation measures, develop monitoring and reporting frameworks, and establish procedures for intervention and corrective measures in case of non-compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy by those non-United Nations entities.

47. Targeted attacks continued on journalists and human rights defenders, in particular on those defending victims in cases involving gender-based violence. Ten journalists (three in Kismaayo, three in Mogadishu and four in "Somaliland") were arrested. No specific measures were taken to reinforce the protection of journalists, notwithstanding a statement by the Federal Government of Somalia indicating its intention to investigate attacks on journalists and bring the perpetrators to justice. The continued application of the death penalty remains a concern, despite the commitment by the Federal Government of Somalia to a moratorium in 2011 during the Universal Periodic Review reporting procedure before the United Nations Human Rights Council remains a concern.

48. The United Nations collaborated closely with the Federal Government of Somalia on the finalization of the post-transition human rights road map, including engaging with relevant ministries and institutions on their roles and responsibilities in the process. There has been continued delays in the broad consultations by the Government and the relevant Parliamentary Committee on the draft law creating the National Human Rights Commission.

49. During the reporting period, UNSOM trained 30 judges and key judicial officers, 20 prosecutors and 30 members of civil society organizations in Puntland on the application of human rights standards in the delivery of justice.

Child protection

50. In November and December 2013, 386 incidents of grave violations affecting 367 children (359 boys and 19 girls) were reported to the United Nations Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting. Overall, most of the violations were committed by Al-Shabaab (57 per cent), followed by the Army and allied militias (31 per cent), who were the main perpetrators of abductions (99 cases). Al-Shabaab was responsible for most cases of the recruitment and use of children (196 cases).

51. The Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict held a special meeting on 24 November to review, before submission to the Federal

Government of Somalia for endorsement, the standard operating procedures for handling children formerly associated with armed forces and groups, which were developed in 2012. This is key to the implementation of the two action plans signed by the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia. The Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting is closely monitoring the formal signing of the standard operating procedures, which was delayed as a result of the dissolution of the previous cabinet.

Gender mainstreaming and women's empowerment

52. From 2 to 4 December, the United Nations hosted the Women and Peace Security Open Day. Some 40 participants called for a greater role of women in politics, identifying political marginalization, the absence of a justice system that addresses gender-based violence, and the lack of respect for the human rights of women as the major challenges. Recommendations included that at least 30 per cent of positions in the new cabinet be held by women and that commitments on gender equality be translated into action.

53. From 10 December to 5 January, 23 representatives of women's organizations from south-central Somalia and Puntland established the Somali Women Leadership Initiative to advocate for heightened participation of women in the Federal cabinet, and the Puntland elections. They held meetings with the President, the Prime Minister and Speakers.

54. On 8 December, the United Nations Gender Theme Group and the Donor Gender Theme Group agreed with the Federal Government of Somalia Director-General on Women, Family and Children Affairs on a road map to finalize the consultation and drafting of the National Gender Policy. The first draft was developed with the support of AMISOM in July 2013.

Sexual violence in conflict and gender-based violence

55. From 3 to 11 December, the United Nations Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict held consultations with the Federal Government of Somalia, various United Nations entities and other stakeholders in Mogadishu and Nairobi, aimed at helping the Federal Government of Somalia fulfil its commitments under the 7 May 2013 joint statement on ending violence against women and girls.

56. The Working Group on gender-based violence, chaired by UNFPA, developed its 2014-2016 strategy around four key areas: prevention; service provision and response; access to justice and rule of law; and coordination. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is currently coordinating the development of an operational manual for the implementation of this strategy. In Puntland, in partnership with the Ministry of Women, Family and Social Affairs, and prominent religious leaders, UNFPA developed a prevention programme against gender-based violence, and established, in collaboration with Muslim Aid, a one-stop centre that provides a comprehensive set of services to survivors of gender-based violence. UNFPA and UNDP trained 26 police officers in Puntland on investigation of and reporting on cases of gender-based violence.

57. In order to strengthen prevention capacities and response to conflict-related sexual violence, 40 AMISOM senior military commanders from Uganda, including

four women officers, were trained on gender issues in Entebbe, Uganda, from 5 to 7 December 2013.

D. Humanitarian situation

58. Nearly 860,000 people remain acutely food insecure, and another 2 million people remain on the margins of food insecurity. Acute malnutrition persists, with 203,000 children malnourished, especially in the south, where at least 50,000 children face increased risk of death.

59. Persistent insecurity in parts of the country continued to limit humanitarian access and delivery of essential assistance. Aid workers have increasingly been the targets of arrest and detention by armed groups. Despite the challenging operating environment, the World Food Programme (WFP) managed to assist about 800,000 people per month, strengthening livelihoods for the most vulnerable. The distribution of food vouchers for disaster-affected people has been expanded in Banadir, Bari, Gedo and Nugaal regions, reducing security concerns around food distribution in volatile areas and stimulating local markets.

60. In spite of difficult conditions, including severed communications and lack of road access after the tropical storm that hit Puntland in November, a majority of about 6,000 directly affected households was reached with critical aid within 10 days following the disaster. WFP provided 27,000 people with food, while the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) helped restore water supplies in Dongaroyo and Eyl. Some 23 schools received emergency supplies for 2,500 children to resume their studies. UNFPA deployed five mobile medical teams with reproductive health supplies sufficient to support 1,000 births. The livestock sector was very affected, and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimated that up to 300,000 animals died within hours. Support was provided by FAO for surviving animals, including vaccination against contagious diseases, and the safe disposal of animal carcasses.

61. Seasonal rains also caused localized flooding, with some 11,000 households affected in Jawhar (Shabelle Dhexe). The situation was compounded by an outbreak of clan fighting in the area, which displaced 3,000 households and hampered access to those in need. Emergency response was provided, including food assistance to 30,000 people. In response to the contamination of water sources by flooding, and an increase in health threats, the Common Humanitarian Fund in December allocated nearly $1.2 million to support emergency health activities and access to clean water and sanitation in the area. The World Health Organization (WHO) and partners also provided support with two mobile health teams and medical supplies in the most affected areas. UNICEF and partners provided over 81,000 people with soap, water purification tablets, chlorine and containers for water storage.

62. Some 600 wounded civilians were treated at four major hospitals supported by WHO in Mogadishu, and another 170 were treated at the main hospital in Kismaayo. Wild polio cases in Somalia stand at 192. No new cases have been reported in the Banadir region, the epicentre of the outbreak, since mass vaccinations began following the outbreak in May 2013. A vaccination campaign against measles and polio targeting over 2 million children was held across southern and central Somalia from 22 to 26 December. The response continues.

63. Following the signing on 10 November of the Tripartite Agreement on the voluntary return of Somali refugees from Kenya to Somalia, Kenya, Somalia and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), agreed on a six-month pilot project to assist voluntary returnees. Some 10,000 Somali refugees will be supported to return to their area of origin. The three pilot areas are: Baidoa, Kismaayo and Luuq. UNMAS is working with UNHCR to ensure that awareness of explosive hazards becomes part of the education offered in preparation for voluntary return. In addition, the Return Consortium, led by UNHCR and comprising eight United Nations entities and NGOs, assisted about 40,000 people to return, mainly from Mogadishu, to their places of origin in Bay, Shabelle Dhexe and Shabelle Hoose.

64. Despite continued advocacy, forced evictions remain a serious threat to displaced people and other vulnerable groups. According to UNHCR, in November and December, about 27,000 people were evicted from different settlements in Mogadishu.

65. In December, the second-year review of the 2013-2015 consolidated appeal process was finalized. The humanitarian community requires $928 million in 2014 based on needs, humanitarian access and a realistic implementation capacity. In 2013, the consolidated appeal process received only 50 per cent of the funding required. Continued underfunding seriously limits the number of people who can receive aid and jeopardizes attempts to build long-term resilience.

E. Stabilization

66. With support from UNSOM, AMISOM and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the Government initiated a successful dialogue with international partners on the strategic and operational coordination of stabilization. Government plans include the nomination of acting interim administrations, shortly after military operations, responsible for immediate day-to-day administration and for initiating a consultative process to establish locally selected administrations to take over from the acting interim structures. They will also coordinate delivery of basic services and other "peace dividends" to the citizens.

F. Socioeconomic recovery and development

67. On 24 November, the Federal Government of Somalia unveiled its 2014 budget proposal. The Government plans to increase annual spending to a total of $219 million in 2014.

68. On 5 November, the remittance company, Dahabshiil, won an injunction at the High Court in the United Kingdom, which will enable it to temporarily maintain an account at Barclays Bank in that country. Irrespective of the outcome, the Dahabshiil case serves to highlight the continuing fragility of the Somali money transfer sector and the urgent need to bring existing money transfer operations into compliance with international regulations on the prevention of money-laundering and the financing of counter-terrorism.

69. Following the resignation of the Governor of the Central Bank on 2 November, and after consultations with international partners, President Mohamud appointed

Mr. Bashir Isse Ali as the interim Governor on 27 November. The Federal Government of Somalia also requested support from the international community for the establishment of a Financial Governance Committee. A joint World Bank, International Monetary Fund and United Nations mission met with senior representatives of the Federal Government of Somalia and the Central Bank in early December. Discussions were still ongoing at the time of the writing of the present report.

70. On 20 December, I declared Somalia eligible to receive support from the Peacebuilding Fund UNSOM and the United Nations country team in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, started identifying urgent peacebuilding priorities to be considered for funding under the Immediate Response Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund. The United Nations in Somalia is also developing a new integrated strategic framework, which will serve as its strategy to consolidate peace in the country. It will also guide the formulation of a Peacebuilding Priority Plan to facilitate Somalia's access to longer-term support from the Peacebuilding and Recovery Facility of the Peacebuilding Fund.

G. Targeted sanctions

71. During the reporting period, the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group obtained evidence of the continued export of Somali charcoal in violation of the ban imposed by the Security Council. The Monitoring Group has provided this information to relevant Member States and the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea.

72. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of its resolution 2111 (2013), the Security Council received the second report of the Federal Government on 7 February.

H. Coordination of international efforts

73. The Federal Government of Somalia has put in place coordination bodies to support the implementation of the Somali Compact. The Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility Steering Committee provides oversight and guidance for the implementation of the Somali Compact and the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility. Its first meeting was held on 11 December in Mogadishu. My Special Representative co-chairs with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud the High-level Partnership Forum. Its first meeting was held on 24 February. Denmark has kindly agreed to host a meeting of the High-level Partnership Forum in the second half of 2014.

IV. Implementation of Security Council resolution 2124 (2013)

74. Significant progress was made towards the implementation of resolution 2124 (2013). On 21 January, the African Union Peace and Security Council adopted a revised concept of operations for AMISOM. The revised concept was developed during a planning workshop organized by the African Union from 9 to 18 December in Nairobi, with the participation of the Federal Government of Somalia and key partners. UNSOM, UNSOA, the United Nations Office to the African Union

(UNOAU) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations provided technical support to the African Union and to the Federal Government of Somalia in the process of developing the concept of operations.

75. The revised concept of operations focuses on operations against Al-Shabaab's strongholds and a degradation of its capability, which are to be followed by stabilization and drawdown phases. It created two additional AMISOM sectors in south-central Somalia and paved the way for the expansion of AMISOM to reach its new authorized strength of 22,126 through the inclusion of Ethiopia as a troop-contributing country. Ethiopian troops were re-hatted into AMISOM on 1 January. A formal ceremony took place on 22 January in Baidoa. The concept of operations also established a framework concept for joint operations by AMISOM and the Somali National Army, which will serve as the basis for front line units of the Somali National Army to receive targeted support through the Trust Fund for AMISOM in Somalia managed by UNSOA.

76. The concept of operations established that units of the Somali National Army benefiting from United Nations support should undergo a basic training package, including human rights training, to be monitored and certified by UNSOM under the human rights due diligence policy. The concept of operations also foresees that AMISOM will work with the United Nations and international partners to establish appropriate and effective procedures for allegations of grave violations of the international humanitarian and human rights law, including conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence. The concept of operations further included the establishment of a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell.

77. The importance of linking the security, political and stabilization efforts through a multidimensional campaign was highlighted during an event hosted by President Mohamud with key partners on 28 January in Addis Ababa. The President announced the creation of a high-level Strategic Coordination Mechanism to ensure coherence between the military campaign and stabilization efforts focusing on the establishment of local administrative structures, public outreach and the delivery of basic services.

78. On 12 and 13 February, UNSOM, joined by UNSOA, UNDP and UNOAU, held a retreat with the African Union and AMISOM near Addis Ababa. This was a landmark event, which brought the African Union and the United Nations together as partners in peace and State-building in Somalia. A total of 26 areas of common mandated tasks between the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia were identified, and relevant recommendations were made to increase and deepen coordination mechanisms, especially in the implementation of Security Council resolution 2124 (2013), the human rights due diligence policy, support to the Government's "Vision 2016", and stabilization efforts to be led by the Federal Government of Somalia and the Somali Compact.

Logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia and the Somali National Army

79. UNSOA continued to provide logistical support to AMISOM in the entire region of south-central Somalia. However, the local administration in Kismaayo has not provided land to UNSOA for the construction of the tactical hub. UNSOA completed the construction of eight accommodation facilities that are compliant

with minimum operating security standards, and the Communications, Information and Technology Services hub in Baidoa. UNSOA also deployed engineering materials and commenced defence installations for the hub perimeter in Beledweyne.

80. The expansion of the UNSOM and UNSOA camp within the AMISOM protected area at the Mogadishu International Airport and the construction of living accommodation facilities, are in progress. However, security concerns within the Airport have generated challenges on staff movement, accommodation and office space requirements. On 28 January, UNSOM opened its offices in Villa Somalia.

81. UNSOA facilitated the rotation of 3,401 AMISOM troops, 297 Police and 7 staff officers. UNSOA also continued to provide medical support to AMISOM, carrying out 51 medical evacuations, and transfer, redeployment and repatriation flights, involving 81 AMISOM personnel. In addition, UNSOA provided predeployment, in-mission and other training for 877 AMISOM personnel.

82. The lack of air assets remains a challenge. The African Union and UNSOA are discussing with Uganda and Burundi the possibility of deploying up to four military rotary-wing assets each.

83. UNSOA continued to provide support to AMISOM in the area of communications and information and technology services. Such support included the provision of Internet connectivity at the Mission and force headquarters, installation of a Tetra system at Mogadishu University and in Baidoa, distribution of laptops to AMISOM, deployment of high frequency secure communications in the sectors, and installation of two module infrastructures cabling for AMISOM force headquarters to provide data connectivity. UNSOA also commenced Internet cabling works in Sector 1 Headquarters.

84. The African Union-United Nations Information Support Team, managed by UNSOA, continued to provide strategic communications support to AMISOM and UNSOM, including live audio and video coverage during the elections in Puntland.

85. I am grateful to the Governments of Canada and the Republic of Korea, which pledged $2,600,000 and contributed $200,000, respectively, to the Trust Fund in Support of AMISOM.

V. United Nations presence in Somalia

86. Negotiations continued for the signature of a status-of-mission agreement for UNSOM and UNSOA. It is expected that the agreement would be concluded in the near future.

87. As of 12 February, a total of 357 international and 973 national staff members from UNSOM, and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes had been deployed. UNSOM deployment strength stood at 65 international and 19 national staff.

88. Some 67 staff in Hargeysa, approximately 12 in Boosaaso, 45 in Garoowe, and 13 in Gaalkacyo were deployed. UNICEF relocated its office in Puntland from Boosasso to Garowe. In south-central Somalia, the presence of international staff remained limited, with approximately 15 in Baidoa, 13 in Dollow, and one in Kismaayo. In addition to its field presence in Garowe, Baidoa, Kismaayo and

Hargeisa, UNSOM inaugurated a dedicated United Nations office at Villa Somalia in Mogadishu in late January to facilitate daily and direct engagement with Government counterparts.

Integration

89. Integration of the United Nations presence into Somalia reached a new milestone with the appointment of Philippe Lazzarini as my Deputy Special Representative, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator on 30 December. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2102 (2013), UNSOM became a structurally integrated Mission on 1 January 2014. Even prior to that date, the Mission and the United Nations country team had established various joint teams and management mechanisms. United Nations entities have worked in close cooperation, especially in the areas of governance, constitutional review, elections, rule of law, police, and justice and corrections, as well as security, and human rights, including advocacy for the protection of internally displaced persons in key areas in southern and central Somalia, and for disengaged combatants.

90. The United Nations is aligning its integrated strategic framework with the Somali Compact. Joint planning is also taking place under the framework of the Somali Compact working groups on the Peacebuilding and State-building Goals, involving Government leads, the United Nations, as well as bilateral and other development partners. A mission of the Global Focal Point for Rule of Law took place from 13 to 26 November to prepare overall strategic directions for the work of the United Nations in this area. As part of the integrated strategic framework process, the United Nations is developing its three-year action plan in support of the Somalia Compact.

Safety and security of staff

91. The United Nations continued to work in a very challenging security environment that hampered the operations of UNSOM and UNSOA, as well as the programme delivery of its agencies, funds and programmes.

92. The implementation of security enhancement measures that were identified in the aftermath of the attack in June on the United Nations Common Compound continued. In terms of operations management, the United Nations, the Somali National Arm and AMISOM are working together to strengthen information-sharing and coordination, including possible responses to support United Nations staff in extreme situations. For example, liaison officers of the National Intelligence and Security Agency and AMISOM have been permanently assigned to the Joint Operations Centre within the Security Information and Operations Centre of UNSOM. This coordination extends to movement security, particularly for areas outside the Mogadishu International Airport and along the airport road to improve security at the compound's gates and operations in the areas bordering the perimeter. This coordination is aimed at denying Al-Shabaab freedom of movement and the capability to have an impact on operations within the Mogadishu International Airport by either direct or indirect attacks.

93. Within the Mogadishu International Airport, a number of interim measures were taken after the attack on 1 January. A combination of measures, including both prevention and protection, allowed a return to the same numbers of personnel prior to the attack. There is continued coordination with AMISOM, the Federal

Government of Somalia and other partners, considering the more recent incidents of indirect fire (mortar attacks) in Mogadishu City, to ensure the maintenance of efforts to deny and deter future stand-off attacks on the Mogadishu International Airport and considering the more recent incidents of indirect fire (mortar attacks) on Mogadishu City.

94. In accordance with resolution 2124 (2013), the deployment of a United Nations Guard Unit in Mogadishu remains a priority for 2014. On 20 December, I wrote to the President of the Security Council regarding the deployment of this unit of 410 personnel to Mogadishu (S/2013/764). The President of the Security Council, in his letter dated 24 December (S/2013/765), informed me that the Security Council had taken note of my intention to deploy the guard unit, and preparations for its deployment are ongoing.

VI. Observations

95. The change of Prime Minister in December 2013 and the appointment of a new cabinet in January 2014 through a constitutional process showed that Somalia's political institutions continue to evolve positively.

96. I welcome the public commitment of Prime Minister Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed to move forward rapidly to achieve the objectives agreed in the New Deal Somali Compact. Progress is needed on political priorities, particularly the formation of Federal States, political reconciliation in the Somali regions and the acceleration of the constitutional review and implementation process. Strengthening of public financial management is also key. The President and Prime Minister have recently put in place structures to coordinate military, stabilization and political activities in the context of the renewed joint AMISOM and Somali military offensive. The United Nations will continue to support the Federal Government of Somalia in this task.

97. The peaceful election on 8 January 2014 of Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas as President of the Puntland State of Somalia marks an important development. I commend the people of Puntland and the authorities, as well as my Special Representative and his colleagues in UNSOM, for ensuring that the process was peaceful, credible and legitimate. I also acknowledge and commend the statesmanship displayed by outgoing President Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud Farole in recognizing the election results, and pledging support for stability, peace and democracy in Puntland. I welcome President Abdiweli Gaas' commitment to establish a one-person-one-vote electoral system and increase the participation and representation of women and youth in public life. I also hope that Puntland and the Federal Government of Somalia will seize the opportunity for an improved relationship. Puntland has an important role to play in the building of a strong federal Somalia.

98. I welcome progress made in implementing the Addis Ababa Agreement of August 2013, including steps towards the establishment of an Executive Council and a regional assembly. These should be inclusive and act in the best interests of all communities and address concerns as they arise. I encourage the Somali parties to continue to make progress and work towards the implementation of all aspects of the Addis Agreement in the spirit of dialogue and compromise.

99. I support the active engagement of the Federal Government of Somalia with those involved in the political deliberations in Baidoa. It is important that they reach a settlement that leads to the formation of a new Federal State through a process which is inclusive and reinforces other emerging federal structures in Somalia.

100. Somalia continues to face considerable security challenges. I pay tribute to AMISOM and the Somali National Army for the sacrifices they continue to make in the fight against Al-Shabaab. I commend the leadership of the African Union Commission in the development of a new AMISOM concept of operations, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2124 (2013), in consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations and the international community. I am encouraged by the commitment of the African Union and the Federal Government of Somalia to immediately commence the implementation of the priorities outlined in the concept of operations. I express my heartfelt appreciation to international partners, in particular the European Union and IGAD, for their commitment to support the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM. All international partners and African Union member States are urged to provide AMISOM with adequate support, especially force multipliers, to ensure that it can effectively fulfil its mandate.

101. Political, security and development gains in Somalia are still reversible. The campaign against Al-Shabaab will not be successful through the use of military means alone. I welcome the coordination mechanism established by the Federal Government of Somalia to link the military offensives with political and stabilization efforts. A multidimensional approach is critical to consolidate military gains and ensure that all Somalis benefit from better governance, rule of law, economic opportunities and basic services. Further steps towards dealing with disengaged combatants in newly accessible areas are also necessary. International contributions to stabilization and early recovery efforts in newly accessible areas must be forthcoming quickly in support of the priorities of the Federal Government of Somalia. I look forward to continued fruitful collaboration in these efforts among the African Union, IGAD, other partners and the United Nations.

102. The international community's support to the Federal Government of Somalia is essential to enable the Somali National Army to conduct operations with adequate equipment, training and human resources. I welcome efforts to ensure full accountability for the targeted logistical support provided to the Somali National Army and its alignment with the broader security sector reform objectives of the Government. I encourage Member States to make sustained and generous contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for this purpose. I underline the importance of full implementation of the steps agreed with the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM to ensure that the United Nations support package for AMISOM and the Somali National Army is consistent with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

103. Inter-clan conflicts remain a potent source of instability and insecurity for Somalis on a day-to-day level. It is imperative that the Federal Government of Somalia promote peacemaking and reconciliation efforts at a local level and act to prevent and halt conflicts over land and productive resources throughout the country.

104. Concerted efforts by the international community have continued to ensure a downward trend in piracy off the coast of Somalia. Development efforts ashore have

also made some progress. The Federal Government of Somalia is taking steps towards asserting its ownership of security off the coast. Continued efforts by the Federal Government of Somalia and international efforts, including naval efforts at sea, remain vital in sustaining progress in maritime security.

105. Continuous support to strengthen the police, justice and corrections institutions and address judicial security is critical to the establishment of the rule of law. I reiterate my call on the Government to place human rights at the forefront of its State-building agenda, in line with its Provisional Constitution and international obligations. This includes the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, a moratorium on the death penalty and the advancement of the rights and empowerment of women.

106. I remain concerned about the continued export of Somali charcoal in violation of the ban set out in Security Council resolution 2036 (2012). I call upon the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM to prevent the export and on Member States to prevent the import of Somali charcoal. I would like to express my appreciation for the important work of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group in this regard and call upon Member States to cooperate with it.

107. Early warnings in late 2013 indicated poor harvests in early 2014, and humanitarian actors worked to strengthen preparedness and response to the possible downturn in food security. Early action has softened the impact and helped prevent a worsening of the crisis. However, recent gains could easily be reversed without sustained assistance. I urge the international community to contribute generously to the 2014 Consolidated Appeal Process for Somalia. It is critical that the level of assistance to Somalia is maintained to ensure that gains made thus far are not eroded.

108. I am pleased to note that following the Brussels conference in September, implementation of the Somali Compact has begun. I urge international partners to ensure that assistance is delivered in line with the Somali Compact partnership principles and to support national efforts in a coordinated manner, including through increased programmatic funding towards restoring law and order and addressing the root causes of the conflict. I encourage meaningful engagement from all stakeholders in the policy discussions of the meetings of the High-Level Partnership Forum meetings in Mogadishu and in Copenhagen later in 2014, to ensure that implementation of the Compact remains on track and translates into the timely delivery of peace dividends to the Somali people.

109. Ultimately, the people of Somalia bear the primary responsibility for bringing lasting peace and stability to the country. It is, therefore, important that the various local stakeholders strive tirelessly to pursue measures, including embracing genuine reconciliation through the spirit of compromise that would enable them to realize this ultimate goal.

110. I pay tribute to my Special Representative, Nicholas Kay, and the members of the staff of UNSOM, and of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other international and regional organizations in Somalia for their continued hard work. I am pleased that UNSOM became a fully integrated mission on 1 January as set out by the Security Council in its resolution 2093 (2013). I also pay particular tribute to the African Union, AMISOM, the European Union and IGAD for their sustained contribution to peace in Somalia. We must enhance partnership to meet the challenges together.



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United Nations S/2014/141

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 March 2014

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Note verbale dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General and, with reference to the summary statement by the Secretary-General of matters of which the Security Council is seized and of the stage reached in their consideration (S/2014/10), has the honour to request that the item entitled "The situation between Iran and Iraq" be retained in the agenda of the Council.

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United Nations S/2014/142

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the Central African Republic submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 48 of Security Council resolution 2127 (2013), by which the Council requested me, in consultations with the African Union, to report to it with recommendations on the possible transformation of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, including an assessment of progress made towards meeting the appropriate conditions on the ground referred to in paragraph 45 of my report of 15 November 2013 (S/2013/677).

2. In preparation of the present report, I dispatched a multidisciplinary team to the Central African Republic from 4 to 15 February 2014. A representative of the African Union Commission was part of the team. My Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, visited the Central African Republic on 11 and 12 February together with a senior official of the African Union Commission for consultations in Bangui with national and international stakeholders, including the Head of State of the Transition in the Central African Republic, ministers of her Government and representatives of civil society, regional organizations and the international community.

II. Major developments

A. Security, human rights and humanitarian developments

3. Since the assessment conducted in November, there have been dramatic changes in the situation on the ground. The attacks by anti-balaka elements against ex-Séléka forces on 5 December in Bangui and Bossangoa, which involved heavy weapons, led to a reversal in the conflict dynamic and a significant deterioration in the security situation and sparked a cycle of reprisals among civilians and clashes between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka forces throughout the country. These developments have led to a grave deterioration in the human rights situation, resulting in a serious protection crisis, with civilians being targeted by all armed groups and by civilians on the basis of their religious affiliation.

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4. Violations that may amount to international crimes have become widespread not only in Bangui but throughout the country. These include serious violations of the rights to life, physical integrity and property, arbitrary detention, the summary execution of civilians, indiscriminate firing on civilians, sexual violence and rape and grave violations against children, including their recruitment and use, killing and maiming and sexual violence. In addition, civilians have increasingly become involved in violence, including killing and looting, in an environment marked by fear, hatred and total impunity, as well as socioeconomic deprivation. Deliberate and targeted violence forcing Muslim populations to flee may amount to the crimes against humanity of forced displacement and/or persecution.

5. The anti-balaka groups, which comprise local defence groups, rogue elements of the armed forces of the Central African Republic and criminal elements, are reportedly becoming increasingly organized in Bangui and other parts of the country and have access to firearms and heavy weapons. While their structure remains unclear, threats emanating from anti-balaka elements go well beyond law and order issues. According to both the French forces of Operation Sangaris and MISCA, anti-balaka groups now represent the main threat to civilians.

6. For much of 2013, many Central Africans suffered under the control of ex-Séléka forces, which were perceived by much of the population as being made up entirely of and as being supported by Muslims. Although this is not the case, the current wave of revenge and reprisal attacks being carried out in the name of Christians are the result of resentment stemming from months of serious human rights abuses. While the violence was not borne of religious or ethnic hatred, manipulation and exploitation by some in positions of power has injected this dimension into the conflict. The longer it is allowed to continue, the more difficult it becomes to address. There is an increasing risk that ethnic groups perceived to have supported ex-Séléka forces could become targets of anti-balaka militias.

7. Killings are reported daily in Bangui. Violence in the capital has reached gruesome levels of cruelty: corpses are mutilated in public and dismemberments and beheadings take place with total impunity. Targeted attacks by anti-balaka groups prevent Muslims from moving out of the few neighbourhoods where they have regrouped. The vast majority of the Muslim population of Bangui has fled and those Muslims who remain live under international protection.

8. The resignation on 10 January of the former Head of State of the Transition, Michel Djotodia, prompted most of the 7,000 ex-Séléka elements to leave the sites where they had regrouped in Bangui since December 2013. Approximately 1,500 armed elements remain regrouped in two sites under MISCA protection, while other elements reportedly continue to operate in civilian clothes in several neighbourhoods of Bangui. The retreat of ex-Séléka elements from Bangui and the western parts of the country has sparked renewed attacks on the remaining members, associates, perceived supporters and members of Muslim civilian communities, who are now deliberately and systematically targeted by anti-balaka elements. These attacks involve killings, targeted assassinations, sexual violence, public lynching, looting and the destruction of property. Mob violence has reached unprecedented levels. Attacks have been publicly referred to by individuals claiming to represent anti-balaka elements as "cleansing operations". There have also been incidents of anti-balaka elements using hate speech on the television and the radio.

9. Ex-Séléka elements are said to be regrouping in locations in the northern and north-eastern parts of the country, including in Kaga Bandoro, Ndélé, Bambari and Bangassou. On 30 January, ex-Séléka elements temporarily took control of the town of Sibut and reportedly announced that this marked a step towards establishing a line of demarcation between Muslim and Christian areas, raising fears of a de facto partition of the country. MISCA subsequently reinforced its deployment in the area. The movement of ex-Séléka elements was marked by significant surges in violence and human rights violations, as those forces destroyed villages, tools and seeds, conscripted forced labour and killed civilians along the way. In-fighting between rival ex-Séléka groups was also reported in a number of areas.

10. Logistical constraints and capability gaps notwithstanding, MISCA has made a significant difference in its areas of deployment in and outside Bangui, including with regard to the protection of civilians. In Bangui, MISCA operations carried out in coordination with Operation Sangaris forces were essential to restore basic security, enable the Transitional Government to resume its work while ensuring freedom of movement for international actors, secure key installations and sites of internally displaced persons and protect national and international stakeholders, including members of the transitional institutions. MISCA has also disarmed and cantoned some ex-Séléka elements. MISCA and Operation Sangaris efforts led to an increase in returns of internally displaced persons in the first weeks of February. MISCA has also collected arms, improved security on the main axis to Cameroon and provided escorts to humanitarian convoys. It has responded to situations on the basis of alerts from local populations and humanitarian actors in places such as Carnot, Berberati, Mbaiki, Bambari and Baoro. Although some interlocutors have identified the perceived partiality of some MISCA contingents as a challenge in some of these areas, MISCA has prevented near massacres and gross human rights violations and contributed to the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance.

11. However, over the past weeks, the ethnic and religious demography of the country has changed radically. Given the intensity of the violence, many Muslims have fled the country, mostly to Cameroon and Chad or to the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic. Many towns that used to have multiconfessional populations, such as Yaloke, Bossemptele, Bozoum and Mbaiki, have been emptied of their Muslim communities.

12. In the light of the dire situation and limited protection, a number of countries have organized the evacuation of their nationals. A transit site has been established in Bangui, where the national army of Chad provides security separate from MISCA. Several thousands of Muslims, including Central Africans, have been evacuated every week by plane, taxi and truck. Many of those evacuated have never lived outside the Central African Republic and have no place to settle. Heavily armed units of the national army of Chad are escorting convoys from Bangui and locations in the west to the northern part of the country and to Chad. In some cases, disproportionate use of force resulting in the death of civilians was reported.

13. At present, more than 15,000 Muslims seeking to flee to safety are taking shelter in 18 locations throughout the country, risking grievous violence if they leave. In numerous places in the north-western, western and central parts of the country, people depend for their lives on MISCA and Operation Sangaris protection. Humanitarian actors face the dilemma of whether to encourage people to stay in their communities, thereby endangering their lives, or to assist them in fleeing for

their own safety, thereby indirectly contributing to the sectarian division of the country.

14. Vulnerable groups, notably women, children and the elderly, continue to be affected disproportionately. Since November 2013, cases of sexual violence perpetrated by armed men, most of whom are believed to be ex-Séléka elements, have been reported in Bangui, Boali, Bossemptele, Damara, Mbaiki and Sibut, as well as in the prefecture of Ouham Pende. During the events of 5 and 6 December in Bangui, numerous rapes, including gang rapes, were reportedly carried out by anti-balaka and ex-Séléka elements, notably during house-to-house searches and retaliatory attacks. Forced marriages involving children have also been reported; most are believed to have been perpetrated by ex-Séléka elements. Cases of sexual violence, including rapes, have been reported at sites where internally displaced persons are located. Incidents involving the abduction of women and sexual slavery have also been reported in the countryside.

15. The grave human rights violations committed against children, particularly reports of their recruitment into armed groups, is alarming. Although precise numbers are difficult to establish, there is evidence that the March 2013 estimate according to which some 3,500 children formed part of Séléka ranks may have increased: as many as 6,000 children could be associated with armed groups. Anti-balaka elements are also reportedly recruiting children. Health centres and schools have been looted across the country and often remain closed, disrupting children's access to education and health care.

16. These developments have resulted in a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions. As at 21 February, 2.5 million people (over half the country's population) were in need of humanitarian assistance. Almost 700,000 Central Africans had been displaced within the country. More than 288,000 were refugees in neighbouring countries and more than 65,000 third-country nationals had been evacuated.

17. Humanitarian needs are immense in all sectors and are likely to increase further, while insecurity impedes aid workers from reaching all those in need. In addition, humanitarian entities are being targeted for their resources. Insecurity along the road from Cameroon, the commercial and humanitarian lifeline to Bangui, affects the delivery of supplies, including relief supplies. MISCA has started to deploy convoy escorts along the road three times a week, which has improved the situation, but demand is great and the route remains insecure. On 12 February, the World Food Programme was forced to open an air bridge from Douala, Cameroon, to Bangui, resulting in an almost eightfold increase in the cost of getting assistance to those in need.

B. Political developments

18. The resignations on 10 January of Mr. Djotodia (see para. 8 above) and the Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye, during a summit of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in N'Djamena has led to a shift in the political landscape. International concerns about the effectiveness of the transitional leadership and its failure to respond to the escalation of violence have increased.

19. On 20 January, the National Transitional Council elected Catherine Samba-Panza, then Mayor of Bangui, as the new Head of State of the Transition of the Central African Republic. Since taking office, Ms. Samba-Panza has taken a number of decisive steps, including the appointment of André Nzapayeké as Prime Minister on 23 January and the formation of a new Transitional Government on 27 January. The new Government comprises 20 members, including three ex-Séléka representatives and one anti-balaka representative. The appointment of over 20 advisers has raised some concern that the office of Ms. Samba-Panza may serve as a shadow cabinet.

20. While not fully in line with the provisions of the Libreville agreements, the N'Djamena Declaration and the transition charter, the formation of the new Government was a positive development that provided new impetus to the transition. Nonetheless, it provoked dissatisfaction among ex-Séléka and anti-balaka leaders and led to a subsequent spike in violence in Bangui. The former political opposition rejected an offer to participate in the Government.

21. The transitional authorities have made additional efforts to establish the required institutional framework to organize the elections, which should conclude the transition period. On 24 December, the seven-member national elections authority was formally established but has yet to become operational. The electoral needs assessment mission that I dispatched to the Central African Republic from 28 January to 11 February concluded that the Transitional Government had declared its intention to organize elections as soon as possible. However, the capacity of national stakeholders to organize the polls within the transitional time frame will depend on their ability to establish local branches of the national elections authority throughout the country and other institutions, such as the High Council for Communication, to complete the legal framework, to restore some security and State authority across the country and disarm, at least in part, armed elements, to address the absence of civil registries and to assess the availability of resources, from both the Transitional Government and international partners, to organize the elections.

22. Determining the appropriate timing for holding elections in the Central African Republic will not only be a matter of putting into place the necessary technical capacities and legal arrangements and of providing a secure environment. It will also depend on establishing the right political environment, one in which elections will help to strengthen society and advance stability rather than be a source of conflict and social instability.

23. The violence in December has further decimated the already scarce national capacities and led to the collapse of the already weak administration. Civil servants have not been paid for five months and the State continues to have no money to pay their salaries. The capacity of the new transitional authorities to effect change will in part depend, in the immediate future, on support from the international community.

24. The situation outside Bangui is marked by the near-total absence of State administration and services. Ex-Séléka elements continue to consider themselves the legitimate representatives of the State in areas where they maintain a presence and seek to exercise State responsibilities, such as law and order and tax collection, although in many cases their actions amount to arbitrary rule and extortion. In some areas in the north-west, anti-balaka groups too are reportedly operating as de facto authorities.

25. The crisis in the Central African Republic is extremely complex. The country has experienced three internal conflicts in 10 years and its third Transitional Government in one year. The current situation is the continuation of a decades-long cycle of political and security crises. At its roots, it stems from long-standing socioeconomic, political, structural and governance deficiencies, from fragile social cohesion and from deep-seated feelings of marginalization among some communities, in particular populations in the northern part of the country, which have felt discriminated against by the central Government. These conditions have been exacerbated by corruption, nepotism, the abuse of power, internal strife, outside interference and the deteriorating capacity of the national army. This context, coupled with extremely weak State institutions, has left consecutive central governments vulnerable. The State is overwhelmed and has virtually no capacity to manage the massive array of threats it is facing and will need to be rebuilt from its foundations. There is no national army and what remains of the police and the gendarmerie lacks the basic equipment and means to exercise its duties. The State administration is absent in many places and the international community is having to substitute for the State in the delivery of basic services where possible.

C. Rule of law

Justice and corrections

26. The events in December have caused a total breakdown of law and order. Courts have been systematically destroyed and attacks have been launched on prisons, resulting in the freeing of some detainees and the killing of others and in constant threats against judges. Courts and prisons have ceased to function, although the main prison in Bangui was reopened on 14 February, following an intervention by the Head of State of the Transition. Civil servants and magistrates have abandoned their positions and it has become impossible to bring suspects to justice, detain them or even carry out arrests. Only a few representatives of law and order institutions have resumed their duties in Bangui. The penal chain has been disrupted, paralysing the proper administration of justice and contributing to large-scale impunity. The situation considerably complicates the work of the international forces.

National police and gendarmerie

27. What remained of the national police was further weakened during the December events. Stations were looted and police and gendarmerie personnel abandoned their positions. Some officers joined the ranks of ex-Séléka and anti-balaka groups. The Compagnie nationale de sécurité, one of the two operational units still in possession of firearms, was first attacked by anti-balaka elements, then disarmed by ex-Séléka forces. Most of the infrastructure has been destroyed. Police officers and gendarmes lack equipment, including radios and protection gear, and have only six vehicles.

28. Police elements have started returning to their duties and three out of eight police stations have reopened in Bangui. To date, 700 police officers (of the 1,675 said to have been working prior to December) have registered in Bangui. A Peacebuilding Fund project worth $2.5 million has been approved to support the rehabilitation of eight police commissariats and three gendarmerie brigades in

Bangui and provide some vehicles and communications equipment. On 15 January, police and gendarmerie started joint patrols with MISCA in Bangui.

29. According to the gendarmerie, 1,200 officers out of 3,500 gendarmerie personnel present before December have registered. Although the bulk of those officers are in Bangui, 226 police personnel are operating outside the capital, including in Boali, Bossemptele, Yaloke, Mbaiki, Nola, Berberati, Bouar, Bangassou, Mobaye, Obo and Bambari.

Disarmament

30. The retreat of the majority of the previously regrouped ex-Séléka elements is a setback for the planning of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. At the same time, the threat posed by anti-balaka and other, already existing or newly emerging, armed groups means that new approaches for managing them are required. There are worrying reports that the prospect of taking part in a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in the future is becoming an incentive for some to take up arms.

31. While it remains challenging to plan a formal disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for ex-Séléka elements, these elements are indicating a willingness to regroup and enter into such a process. Those currently regrouped lack sufficient food, shelter and access to medical facilities.

32. Under the new Transitional Government, responsibility for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has shifted to the Ministry of Defence. While a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy was adopted on 15 November 2013, it needs to be revised to reflect the new realities on the ground. The need to address the security challenges unique to the Central African Republic, including the presence of anti-balaka and other community-based militias or groups, will require the design and implementation of a creative, tailored programme that could include some combination of community violence reduction, emergency employment, social cohesion and reconciliation activities. Such a tailored programme would need to be designed through a close collaboration between the Government and the United Nations. There should be an immediate focus on measures that can have a quick impact on the security situation, including measures aimed at disarming and cantoning armed elements, while longer-term and more comprehensive and sustainable disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are developed. Contributions of partners to early recovery and social cohesion programmes aimed at restoring livelihoods will be critical for breaking the cycle of insecurity and violence at the community level.

Reconstitution of the national defence and security forces

33. Efforts have been made to identify and regroup former elements of the armed forces of the Central African Republic. On 5 February, 6,500 of the 8,434 elements that used to make up the armed forces responded to a call by the Head of State of the Transition to gather at the École Nationale d'Administration et de Magistrature. Aside from the lack of financial and logistical resources, the public lynching of a member of the armed forces who had been an ex-Séléka element minutes after the public ceremony at which the Head of State of the Transition officially assumed control over the army illustrates the deep divisions that exist within the armed forces and the need to restructure them from their foundations. The new Minister of

Defence has indicated a desire to create an army that is representative of the whole population and, in doing so, to include ex-Séléka members. However, any integration into the army should take place within the parameters of a political framework that lays out the basic preconditions for integration, including vetting for human rights or other abuses.

Mine action

34. In December 2012, the United Nations recorded stockpiles that included 11,654 items of obsolete ammunition, explosive remnants of war and 165,934 items of small arms ammunition. During the inspection of those stockpiles in November 2013, it was established that 83 per cent of the obsolete ammunition and explosive remnants and 99 per cent of the ammunition holdings had disappeared. There are concerns that much of these items are currently in the hands of the armed groups and civilians.

D. Socioeconomic situation

35. Before the most recent crisis, the Central African Republic ranked 180th of 186 countries on the Human Development Index of the United Nations Development Programme. Since then, the socioeconomic situation in the country has deteriorated markedly. The crisis has negatively affected the economy and is expected to have long-term consequences for the people despite the country's wealth of natural resources. The massive movement of Muslim populations, traditionally at the centre of the small-scale trade and commerce sectors, has resulted in a shortage of goods, including medicines, and has also caused a significant increase in market prices. Most of the goods are imported through the principal road linking the Central African Republic to Cameroon but insecurity has blocked free passage.

36. Public finances have collapsed. According to projections of the International Monetary Fund, the gross domestic product contracted by 14.5 per cent in 2013 and the inflation rate stood at 12 per cent. The account deficit totalled 5.6 per cent of the gross domestic product in 2013. The most pronounced poverty is found in rural areas. A total of 75 per cent of the population relies on small-scale agriculture for food and income. A lack of seeds and tools, combined with continued insecurity, is likely to have a significant negative impact on agriculture production and commodity prices, and heighten the real risk of a food and nutrition crisis.

37. The World Bank, through a restructuring of its current operations and additional financing, has committed some $100 million in support of emergency response efforts, including rapid support to the public sector. The World Bank, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund intend to re-engage with authorities to discuss direct budget support. However, the ability to re-engage with national authorities will depend on the prevailing security situation in the country.

38. The combination of widespread poverty, disruptions to commerce and agriculture, continued insecurity in many parts of the country, large-scale population displacements and the total absence of public services by the Government leaves the population and country extremely vulnerable to a looming and even deeper socioeconomic and humanitarian crisis.

E. Subregional aspects

39. The subregion, under ECCAS leadership, has remained actively engaged in fostering a solution to the current crisis, including through efforts led by the President of Chad and Chair of ECCAS, Idriss Deby Itno, and the President of Congo and Chair of the Follow-up Committee on the Inclusive Political Dialogue in the Central African Republic, Denis Sassou Nguesso, as well as through the provision of temporary financial support to pay the salaries of civil servants. A joint ECCAS-African Union delegation comprising the Foreign Ministers of Chad and Congo, the Minister of Defence of Congo and the African Union Commissioner for Peace and Security visited Bangui on 28 December 2013 to stress the need for cohesion and effective unity of action among all stakeholders.

40. ECCAS, working in close coordination with the African Union, responded to the deteriorating situation by convening the Sixth Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of ECCAS, held in N'Djamena on 9 and 10 January. During that meeting, the former Head of State of the Transition, Mr. Djotodia, announced his resignation. In a subsequent communiqué, ECCAS Heads of State and Government regretted the passivity of the political class in the Central African Republic and the lack of unity within the Transitional Government and called for the swift election of a new Head of State of the Transition. They also asked the ECCAS secretariat and the African Union Commission to examine the modalities of the organization of the National Reconciliation Conference, under the auspices of the mediator. On 29 January, the African Union Peace and Security Council took note of the decisions taken by ECCAS at the Sixth Extraordinary Summit and urged the international community, including the United Nations, to provide all necessary support to the efforts of the leaders of the region to facilitate an effective international action in support of the Central African Republic.

41. The crisis has affected neighbouring countries, where more than 288,000 Central Africans have sought refuge, almost 54,600 of them since December 2013. There are continuing reports of the presence of foreign fighters in the Central African Republic, including Boko Haram elements and others who crossed the border from Darfur and other regions. The dissolution of State authority and the commission of crimes against the Muslim minority have created conditions that extremist groups from inside and outside the subregion could seek to exploit. In order to promote the long-term stability and economic development of the Central African Republic, it is critical that such groups not be allowed to take advantage of the current chaotic conditions and establish a foothold in the country.

III. International security response

A. African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic

42. On 13 December, following consultations on the margins of the Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa, held in Paris on 6 and 7 December, the African Union Peace and Security Council authorized an increase in MISCA strength from 4,500 to 6,000 uniformed personnel. Pursuant to the agreement reached by the African Union and ECCAS, authority was transferred from the Mission of ECCAS

for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic to MISCA on 19 December 2013. MISCA expedited its force generation process and managed to reach its full strength by early February, although some critical capabilities have yet to be deployed.

43. As at 21 February, MISCA strength stood at 6,032 uniformed personnel, including 5,404 military personnel and 628 police personnel forming four formed police units. The latter started foot patrols in Bangui, as their vehicles have yet to be deployed. The MISCA civilian component comprises 35 personnel (compared with the 152 envisaged in the concept of operations) specialized in political affairs, humanitarian liaison, human rights and mission support. Liaison mechanisms have been established to promote coordination between MISCA and Operation Sangaris forces, as well as with the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army, deployed in Obo Province, south-eastern Central African Republic. Since his appointment as Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and Head of MISCA, Jean-Marie Michel Mokoko has worked closely with my Special Representative and Head of the Integrated United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), Babacar Gaye, and other stakeholders to address the unfolding crisis. MISCA achievements have been made at the cost of great sacrifices, including 17 fatalities and 118 wounded.

44. Its swift deployment notwithstanding, MISCA faces significant challenges in terms of air mobility, information and communications systems, intelligence capacity, medical facilities and logistics supply and sustainment. Given the poor state of the road infrastructure, the absence of enablers and multipliers such as signal units, engineering capacity, heavy transport equipment and utility helicopters hampers the mission's operations. There is an urgent need for enablers and force multipliers to enable MISCA to conduct operations more effectively.

45. The United Nations, together with France and the United States of America, is deploying military and civilian experts to work with MISCA to strengthen its command and control and administrative structures, improve its information and communications technology infrastructure and provide training. During a donors conference held by the African Union on 1 February, donors pledged approximately $316 million in support of the Central African Republic, including MISCA. The MISCA budget for 2014 amounts to $409 million. Using the trust fund, the United Nations is upgrading MISCA information and communications capabilities. On 20 and 26 February, the United Nations sent two aircraft to Bangui carrying 1,200 very high frequency hand-held radios, 25 repeaters and other assorted items of information and communications technology and power-generation equipment. The United Nations has also deployed experts to install the equipment and train MISCA personnel to use it.

B. Operation Sangaris and the deployment of the European Union force

46. Operation Sangaris of France deployed to the Central African Republic on 6 December with the aim of restoring minimum security conditions in Bangui and supporting the build-up of the MISCA force. A total of 2,000 Operation Sangaris military personnel are deployed in Bangui and in hotspots in the western and

northern parts of the country, including in the towns of Berberati, Yaloke, Boda and Bambari and in Vakaga prefecture.

47. On 10 February, the Council of the European Union established a European Union military operation in the Central African Republic, which is to contribute to a safe and secure environment in the Bangui area for up to six months, with a view to handing over to partners. The force is expected to commence deployment early in March and begin operations soon thereafter.

C. Immediate measures

48. The continued deterioration in the security situation, in particular the widespread killings and pervasive threats to civilians described above, demands the focused attention of and urgent action by the international community. On 20 February, I proposed to the Security Council a new six-point initiative designed to stop the violence and killings, protect civilians, prevent the de facto partition of the country, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and provide the Government with some urgently needed support. The initiative calls for the rapid reinforcement of the African Union and French forces on the ground and the deployment of additional troops and police personnel; the provision of logistical and financial support to African forces; the coordinated command of the international forces, with a narrowly focused mission to prevent killings and protect civilians; a rapid infusion of tangible support to the Government of the Central African Republic; the acceleration of a political and reconciliation process for the country; and urgent and full funding for humanitarian operations.

49. Even as we lay the groundwork for a future United Nations peacekeeping operation, it is critical that all actors focus on the most urgent, high-priority objectives, namely halting the violence against innocent civilians, protecting civilians and providing relief to those in need. Achieving these objectives will require the contribution of many actors. I urge Member States, regional organizations and other key partners to make tangible contributions to ensure the success of this initiative through the provision of military and police personnel, funding for humanitarian operations, financial and material support to MISCA and the Government of the Central African Republic, as well as political support to the peace and reconciliation process.

IV. Conditions for the United Nations peacekeeping operation to operate successfully

50. In my report on the Central African Republic dated 15 November 2013 (S/2013/677), I outlined a number of conditions that need to be present on the ground in order for a United Nations peacekeeping operation to operate successfully. They include the need for the transition to remain in place and for the Transitional Government to demonstrate its commitment to the process and take concrete steps to implement the agreed framework. The new Head of State of the Transition and her Government have taken encouraging steps to demonstrate their commitment to moving the process forward and addressing immediate challenges, including the reopening of the prison in Bangui and negotiations on the payment of salaries of civil servants. There is hope that the new leadership will put the transition process

back on track and create conditions conducive to the holding of elections. However, the fragility of the current political framework, which has not been fully adhered to and is overtaken by events, has been identified as a major risk for any future peacekeeping operation.

51. With regard to the reconstitution of the national security institutions, distinguishing between forces officially representing the State security apparatus and forces acting outside of any legal framework requires, first and foremost, a national vision with regard to security and rule of law institutions throughout the country and the future composition of the armed forces, including criteria for the integration of its members and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former armed elements. Although some progress has been made at the technical level, building consensus around such a vision is fundamentally a political process that has yet to take place.

52. The situation in the Central African Republic has changed drastically, as described above. While the current and future political contexts in the country are important long-term success factors for the mission, the most important and urgent consideration is the protection of civilians and the creation of a secure environment throughout the country. Consequently, I am proposing the rapid deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation to address the key security challenges in the country.

V. Recommendations for the possible transformation of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic into a United Nations peacekeeping operation

53. In a letter dated 27 January 2014, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central African Republic requested that a United Nations peacekeeping operation be deployed to stabilize the country and address the civilian aspects of the crisis. The Head of State of the Transition reiterated the request in the meeting with my Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations held in Bangui on 12 February.

54. In a letter dated 17 February 2014, the Chairperson of the African Union noted that the deployment of MISCA was aimed at facilitating a broader and more sustainable international engagement in the Central African Republic, which would include the deployment of a United Nations operation in due course, once the required conditions had been created on the ground. Expressing the hope that, within 6-9 months, the initial stabilization phase would be completed, the African Union expressed the view that the precise time frame should be determined on the basis of regular joint assessments of the situation.

A. Deployment of the proposed peacekeeping mission

55. The challenges that confront the Central African Republic run deep and are not given to easy solutions. In spite of the progressive effectiveness of MISCA and Operation Sangaris, the current deployment of international security forces is not sufficient and lacks the civilian component to adequately protect civilians under

imminent threat or to tackle the root causes of the conflict. Addressing the crisis in the Central African Republic requires a unified and integrated approach through the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation, with the protection of civilians as its utmost priority. An important factor that has influenced my decision to recommend the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is that the Organization is uniquely positioned to deploy and sustain a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with the full range of capacities that are required to address the deep-rooted nature of the complex crisis now unfolding in the Central African Republic.

56. In the early stages of its deployment, a United Nations peacekeeping operation will need to focus its efforts on the most urgent priorities and to provide some immediate dividends to the population in the areas of security, protection of civilians, human rights and justice, building on the progress made by MISCA and Operation Sangaris. In the long term, in order for the United Nations to make a lasting difference in the Central African Republic, it will need to support national efforts to break the cycle of recurring political and security crises and to contribute to establishing the conditions for long-term stability and social and economic development.

57. The objectives and priorities of a United Nations operation, and hence its configuration and activities, should be adjusted over time to the particular conditions and needs of the country and its people. Thus, the objectives of the United Nations peacekeeping operation during the early phase of its deployment will focus on providing a secure environment, a sine qua non for progress in other areas, supporting the Transitional Government to exercise basic State functions, supporting peace and reconciliation efforts, protecting basic human rights and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. As conditions evolve in the country and, in particular, as the security situation improves and national security capabilities develop, the objectives of the United Nations mission will shift to focus increasingly on supporting the extension of State authority and the State's ability to deliver public services, the consolidation of a stable political environment, the reconciliation of communities and the return of people to their homes, the development of rule of law institutions and the promotion of respect for human rights. An exit strategy, which will have to be based on progress made in building national capacities, will need to be determined from the outset.

58. The work of the United Nations in the Central African Republic must be based on a clear understanding of the current situation and be tailored to the future needs of its people. A "fit-for-purpose" approach is required, focusing on a strong, flexible and mobile countrywide deployment of uniformed personnel and civilians that will allow the mission to prevent and respond to security threats as they evolve, while giving the necessary attention to priorities in its civilian activities. Critical benchmarks will be built into the mandate at every stage of the mission so as to enable it to move as rapidly as possible from entry to stabilization, consolidation and a sustainable exit.

59. Because of the unique circumstances of the Central African Republic, the approach taken in military, police and civilian deployments must be phased in a deliberate manner and be linked to the priority objectives of the mission. To deal with immediate security needs, there will be an initial surge of military personnel and corresponding military enablers. Alongside this initial military surge, essential

civilian capacities will be deployed, phased in gradually as the situation stabilizes and as the necessary living and working facilities are developed, and more work can be undertaken on civilian tasks. Police will also be phased in and, as the security environment improves, should eventually replace the bulk of the initial military surge capacity. While a large, initial military deployment will be necessary to address the security challenges, it is envisaged that United Nations military forces would progressively draw down as quickly as conditions permit, allowing the United Nations to focus as much of its efforts as possible on critical civilian, State-building tasks. System-wide assessments will be conducted to further refine and elaborate the overall United Nations response. Efforts will be necessary from the outset of the mission to manage the expectations of the population through a strong communications strategy.

B. Mandate of the proposed mission in the Central African Republic

60. It is recommended that, operating under a Chapter VII authorization, the mandate of the proposed United Nations peacekeeping operation include: (a) the protection of civilians; (b) the protection of United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensuring the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; (c) support for the political process and key elements of the transition, including the restoration of State authority and its extension throughout the territory; (d) the creation of security conditions conducive to the delivery of principled humanitarian assistance and the safe, voluntary and sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees; (e) the promotion and protection of human rights; (f) the promotion of a national dialogue, mediation and reconciliation at all levels; and (g) support for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former armed elements, with specific attention to children, and the repatriation of foreign elements, as well as community violence-reduction programmes.

61. Additional tasks should include: (a) support for the organization and conduct of elections; (b) support for security sector reform; (c) support for the police, justice and correctional institutions to reinstate the criminal justice system; (d) mine action, monitoring of weapons and ammunition trafficking and stockpile management; (e) coordination of international efforts in support of enhancing good governance, including the development of sound fiscal policies and natural resources management; and (f) institution-building and laying the groundwork for long-term socioeconomic recovery.

62. It is important to stress that not all of these activities will be carried out in equal proportions at all stages of the peacekeeping mission's presence. On the contrary, the mission will need to regularly adjust its priority activities, and hence its configuration, to the circumstances on the ground.

C. Tasks to be fulfilled by the United Nations mission

Protection of civilians

63. The key focus of the United Nations mission in the initial stage must be the protection of civilians. This requires military and civilian expertise in civil-military coordination, liaison with local populations, gender expertise, human rights

monitoring and reporting, integrated common threat analysis and early warning capabilities at the national and local levels, together with the design of coherent coordination mechanisms, including with the humanitarian protection cluster. Such focus should go hand-in-hand with the deployment of specialized civilian capabilities to restart immediately a minimally functional criminal justice chain through the robust deployment of justice and corrections functions.

Military component

64. As indicated in my briefing to the Security Council on 20 February, considering the military threats and virtually non-existent national security apparatus, more troops are needed in the Central African Republic to address the situation in the initial phase of the peacekeeping operation. The proposed concept of operations has been developed on the assumption that the force is deployed with a robust mandate and adequate resources with the capacity to react adequately to changing circumstances and pre-empt potentially destabilizing events. The military component should be progressively reduced as critical benchmarks are met.

65. It is envisaged that the strength of the peacekeeping operation would comprise up to 10,000 troops and 1,820 police personnel, including the required capacities and enablers. The proposed force levels have been defined by a number of factors, which include the need to have a balanced and deterrent presence throughout the country, to protect civilians, to monitor border areas, to support the transition; to secure major lines of mobility and communication, in particular the main supply route from Cameroon, to support the delivery of humanitarian assistance where appropriate and to safeguard United Nations personnel and installations.

66. In addition to eight infantry battalions, there is a requirement for a properly constituted reserve and key assets such as logistics, aviation and engineers. In addition, it is recommended that the force may contribute at a later stage, in partnership with others, to the broader effort to reconstitute the national defence and security forces, which will be critical for the United Nations exit strategy. Depending on the role that the force will eventually take on, the deployment of additional capability such as a training assistance unit could be considered in due course. Particular emphasis is placed on the military observers, including female officers who can reach out and liaise with local communities, in coordination with a strong civil affairs component, and carry out the vital task of monitoring cross border movements. The employment of technology for surveillance operations to assist in the early warning of threats to civilians and United Nations personnel and in monitoring key areas of instability will be important to enhance mandate implementation, improve the safety and security of United Nations personnel and reduce resource requirements.

67. The United Nations operation will be expected, in an initial phase, to continue MISCA efforts to provide security to key installations and national stakeholders in Bangui. However, the mission's capacity to provide security to key national stakeholders, including members of the Transitional Government and magistrates, will be limited. It is therefore recommended that the police component assist in building the capacity of the national police and the gendarmerie in providing close protection.

Police component

68. To address the current situation of violence and impunity, a military response alone, no matter how robust, will not be sufficient. I therefore recommend that the proposed mission include a United Nations police component with a focused mandate and supporting capabilities to protect civilians and support the resumption of activities of the national police and the gendarmerie. The United Nations policing intervention will face critical challenges, such as the rapid generation of specialist capacities such as crowd control, to undertake reform and restructuring activities. Individual police officers and formed police units will be generated and deployed, including through a rehatting of MISCA police in keeping with United Nations policies. The United Nations police concept envisages that the initial deployment will be in Bangui, with a view to expanding outside the capital as security and other conditions permit. The focus of the police component's activities, and its deployment, will be adjusted to the particular requirements on the ground, as with other components.

69. Stabilizing the security situation requires addressing impunity and bolstering confidence in the justice system. The proposed mission should therefore also assist in mobilizing and coordinating international donor support to provide essential infrastructure, equipment and logistics for the law enforcement institutions and support national authorities in their training, reform, restructuring and development, within the context of a national security sector reform strategy. Serious consideration should be given to the adoption of urgent temporary measures in the security and rule of law areas to avoid a continuation of the total impunity that currently exists in the country.

Civilian component

70. While the deployment of a robust, capable, military force is critical to addressing the urgent security challenges in the country, it is civilians who will need to work hand in hand with partners to assist the Government and the people of the Central African Republic as they seek to build their State. Civilian efforts should focus on the protection of civilians, reconciliation, facilitating the political process, and building the State's capacity to address the most pressing challenges and needs of the population.

71. Progress on the political front will be of paramount importance to ensure that the transition process remains on track, while creating conditions conducive to the rebuilding of the national army, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, comprehensive security sector reform, reconciliation and the development of democratic institutions. The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation would provide unity of effort and the leverage to promote a political process and address the root causes of the conflict. This will require a strong good offices role for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as an important analytical capacity.

72. The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation should be an opportunity to revitalize a meaningful political process, in support of regional efforts, in order to build a national consensus around the future armed forces and create the conditions for the holding of free, fair and inclusive elections, including a level playing field for all candidates. Peacekeeping missions have demonstrated in the past that their support can be critical to transparent and democratic processes.

73. The recent crisis has further divided and destroyed the social fabric of the Central African Republic. A United Nations peacekeeping operation should support initiatives throughout the country, in close coordination with the United Nations country team and other partners, including religious and community leaders, to extend State authority, resolve local tensions and promote local conflict resolution, mediation and reconciliation efforts in order to enhance the environment for peaceful coexistence and the voluntary and sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

74. The Central African authorities require extensive technical and capacity-building support to ensure that State institutions are sufficiently equipped to address the most urgent challenges and needs of the population. Support to national institutions both at the central and local levels, in partnership with the United Nations country team and others, should constitute a critical focus of the peacekeeping mission. A strong civil affairs presence in the regions should provide critical support to the local authorities, including in the lead-up to an eventual electoral process.

75. A strong communications and public information component would contribute to easing tensions and promoting reconciliation throughout the country. The establishment of a United Nations radio capacity covering the entire country is recommended given the complex political context within which the mission will be operating, the weakness of the country's media sector and the extremely high expectations in the Central African Republic pertaining to the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping operation.

76. To support a stabilization of the security situation, the mission should facilitate the reopening and rehabilitation of existing courts, prisons, police stations and related infrastructure. It should also support the operation of secure and safe prisons in line with international minimum standards, including by building the capacity of prison personnel; the regular judicial review of pretrial detainees; the establishment of mobile courts; and support for the expansion of legal aid throughout the country. Support will be provided within the framework of the global focal point on justice, police and corrections through joint programming where appropriate, and in coordination with international partners.

77. I recommend the inclusion in the proposed mission of substantial justice and corrections components. Their mandate should include the coordination of international assistance. These components will work with national and international actors and help ensure that these public services are provided impartially and without discrimination.

78. I also recommend that a small embargo cell be established within the proposed peacekeeping operation comprising experts on arms, natural resources and customs in order to support the group of experts in monitoring the sanctions regime and to advise my Special Representative.

79. The proposed peacekeeping operation should also play a role in support of the Government in providing expert advice with regard to security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements.

80. From the outset, the mission will require a strong human rights component to focus on the fight against impunity, accountability and transitional justice. The human rights component will also monitor and publicly report on violations of

international human rights law and have a robust outreach capability, as well as investigative and reporting capacities.

81. Human rights deployments to high-risk areas will contribute to the mission-wide effort to protect civilians, enhance deterrence and advise on mission responses to identified threats and preventive engagement with potential perpetrators, in close cooperation with the military and police components. The human rights component will support the implementation of the recommendations of the International Commission of Inquiry in order to help the national authorities fight impunity and devise transitional justice options. Addressing impunity and supporting accountability for human rights violations will be one of the main areas of focus. This will entail targeted programmes to support judicial institutions in swiftly investigating and prosecuting human rights cases. Programmes will also be required to support access to justice for victims and restore the capacities of civil society to engage on human rights promotion and protection. Helping to provide a secure environment to judicial authorities, courts and prisons will be equally important to ending impunity and creating an environment conducive to respect for human rights. The human rights component will also assist in strengthening national human rights institutions and capacities.

82. The systematic and widespread recruitment and use of children will require, in the initial phase of the mission, a robust response through the deployment of a strong child protection capability, which would complement the programmatic efforts of the United Nations Children's Fund to monitor and report on grave violations against children, separate children from armed groups and mainstream child protection concerns within the United Nations response. There are indications that sexual violence is employed as part of systematic attacks against civilian populations. There will be a need for a strong capacity to address this issue including through the deployment of advisers with women and child protection expertise, notably in the human rights and gender units.

83. Humanitarian access is extremely challenging owing to the prevailing insecurity, which is also the most significant impediment to the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. A United Nations peacekeeping operation will need to make a positive contribution to the restoration of security and the free movement of goods and people, which would facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary and sustainable return of displaced persons and refugees. While promoting an integrated approach to the crisis, it will be important to ensure a distinction between political and security efforts on the one hand and humanitarian operations on the other hand, so that humanitarian assistance can be provided throughout the country in a manner that is in keeping with humanitarian principles and is perceived as impartial and independent by the people.

84. The development of sound fiscal policies and good economic governance will be critical for the functioning of the State and its ability to deliver. The United Nations mission will cooperate closely with international financial institutions to support the Government in these areas. In particular, it will be necessary to ensure that the natural resources of the Central African Republic can be harnessed effectively to contribute to the restoration of State authority in Bangui and beyond, as well as to the stabilization of the country through the provision of infrastructure and basic social services. The United Nations will consult with the Government and partners to determine how best to assist in this area and, in particular, what role the

United Nations mission might play in ensuring the collection of customs revenues and other revenues associated with the exploitation of natural resources.

85. The proposed peacekeeping operation will only succeed if the region continues to play an important and complementary role, including through the mediation of President Sassou Nguesso, ECCAS and the African Union. The mission should therefore work closely with and provide full political support to the African Union and ECCAS, as well as limited operational support within its means, capabilities and authorities, so that they can continue to play a role in stabilizing the country. This may include support to the deployment of African Union and ECCAS human rights and military observers and other support, as appropriate. While there will be no rehatting of civilian MISCA personnel, it is recommended that an African Union liaison capacity be established within the new mission.

86. All support provided by the United Nations will be in strict compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (A/67/775-S/2013/110).

D. Safety and security of United Nations personnel

87. The principal threats to United Nations staff are expected to derive from continued violence between armed groups, mob violence and increased criminality, as well as from efforts to provide resources for armed activity, with vehicles in high demand. United Nations national staff are at particular risk. They are indiscriminately targeted on the basis of their religious affiliation and because they are perceived to be wealthier than the average population by virtue of their United Nations employment. While, so far, the United Nations has not been targeted specifically, one national staff member was killed on the basis of his religious affiliation. Attacks targeting United Nations personnel cannot be ruled out should the proposed mission be perceived to be undermining the interests of specific groups or if the United Nations is perceived as partial.

88. Prevailing threats and the absence of the national security apparatus will require a significant security component with high-quality personnel and a strong analytical capacity. While United Nations personnel should not take undue risks, it is critical in the context of the Central African Republic that the mission adopt an enabling posture, allowing the United Nations to deliver on its mandate.

E. Support considerations

89. Mounting and sustaining a large, highly decentralized multidimensional mission in a landlocked country with extremely poor infrastructure will be a daunting challenge. Building the necessary capacity to support the planned deployments (working and living accommodations with the necessary security features; information, communications and technology capabilities; medical services; air and land transportation infrastructure and vehicles) and putting in place supply chains for food, water, fuel and other material, will take time to accomplish and be costly. The phased deployment of the mission's components will not only need to be synchronized with the priorities for mandate delivery but will also need to match the mission's ability to receive and support personnel and units.

90. The internal road network is poor and largely impassable during the extended rainy seasons. This will complicate deployment and increase reliance on air transport. The airfields outside Bangui are generally in poor condition. Consequently, the mission will initially have to rely heavily on helicopters for a wide range of operational tasks. As it is expected that the mission will be present in the country for a prolonged period, however, it will make some significant investments early on in air field upgrades to allow for greater use of fixed-wing aeroplanes. This will enhance operational performance, increase the safety of flight operations and save money in the long run.

91. Local commercial construction capability will not be able to cope with the surge in the construction that is required to establish the mission. A surge of engineering, transport and support capacity will be essential at the outset, while self-sustained military enabling units must arrive first and in the shortest time frame possible. The degree to which Member States are willing to provide military construction engineers at the early stages of deployment will have a significant impact on the mission's ability to develop the required facilities. After a heavy focus on construction during the initial phases of deployment, it is expected that some engineering units will be able to repatriate as the focus of the mission's activities evolves. To augment the military enabling capacity so that the mission can be mounted in the shortest time possible, partnerships with other United Nations agencies will be pursued.

92. The mission's deployment will be underpinned by the principles of the global field support strategy. I will also instruct my Special Representative and Headquarters departments to use all the authorities available to me and the Secretariat to get the mission standing as a matter of priority, especially in the areas of human resources and service delivery, notably with regard to construction and engineering services.

F. Transition

93. Building on the lessons learned from previous transformations of regional operations into United Nations peacekeeping missions and taking into account specific challenges on the ground, it will take the United Nations approximately six months to prepare the deployment of its operation. In order for the United Nations mission to be ready and to ensure a smooth transition, it is recommended that the Secretariat, in coordination with the African Union Commission, immediately deploy a transition team, with MISCA and BINUCA participation, to the Central African Republic with the task of establishing the proposed peacekeeping operation and preparing for a transfer of authority by 15 September. As an immediate priority, the team would develop strategic plans, most importantly a mission concept and related concepts of operations and support plans, while initiating the construction of necessary facilities, including the mission's headquarters, camps and field offices throughout the country. This would entail the immediate deployment of requisite civilian capacities, including air assets and engineers. The team should also assist in the early recruitment of civilian capacities with the required language skills.

94. While the Secretariat should initiate force generation with a particular focus on the necessary military enablers and police, the team would work with MISCA to support the strengthening of its contingents and to address critical gaps for possible

rehatting into the peacekeeping operation, including through the use of the dedicated trust fund. The facilities provided and services delivered by the team would be made available to the MISCA troops identified for rehatting to the United Nations mission. In that regard, the team would seek to prioritize the establishment of rations, water and fuel supply lines in preparation for the incoming United Nations forces. These supplies would be made available to the relevant MISCA forces as soon as possible to assist them in developing their operational capability in preparation for their joining the United Nations mission. Similarly, while the team would need to quickly put in place an aviation capability so that it could begin its work around the country, the United Nations would agree to transport MISCA personnel on its aircraft on a "space available" basis and without compromising United Nations operations.

VI. Observations

95. I am deeply concerned about the dramatic deterioration in the situation in the Central African Republic. The staggering level of violence and massive displacement are changing the country's demography with potentially long-term consequences. The attacks by anti-balaka militias in December in Bangui against ex-Séléka elements reversed the conflict dynamic and sparked a vicious cycle of reprisals among civilians and clashes between armed militias that deeply affect civilians throughout the country. International efforts, in particular the swift deployment of MISCA and the French forces of Operation Sangaris, were critical to saving the lives of civilians. I commend the African Union and the French forces for their quick deployment. I pay tribute to their dedication and courage to implement their mandates in difficult circumstances and extend my sympathy to the families of those who lost their lives in the service of peace. I welcome the decision to increase the number of international forces, including through the temporary deployment of a European Union force. I urge European and other leaders to commit additional troops and police personnel during this critical interim phase.

96. I am encouraged by the swift formation of the Transitional Government under the leadership of the new Head of State of the Transition, Catherine Samba-Panza, and her expressed willingness to tackle the multiple and daunting challenges ahead. The Transitional Government will, however, need the sustained engagement of its neighbours, the region and the broader international community to steer the country out of the current crisis. The United Nations and the international community at large stand ready to support the Central African Republic. First and foremost, however, it is the responsibility of Central Africans themselves to find a solution to the suffering inflicted on their country. I therefore call on all Central African stakeholders to seize the opportunity of this transition period to address the immediate challenges facing the country, cease the violence and restore the country's tradition of peaceful coexistence, while laying the groundwork for sustainable peace and stability. I encourage them to cooperate fully with MISCA and other international forces, as well as with my Special Representative on the ground and the proposed peacekeeping mission, once it deploys.

97. Despite the presence of international forces, violence and widespread human rights violations continue to take place throughout the country. It is clear that we, the international community, have not yet done enough to help the people of the Central African Republic to confront this crisis, which began long before the Séléka rebellion of 24 March 2013. The time to act is now. This is why I have presented the

Security Council with a six-point initiative proposing immediate measures to stop the violence and killings, protect civilians, prevent the de facto partition of the country, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and provide the Transitional Government with urgently needed support. I once again urge the Council to support these proposals, as a vital bridging measure, pending the eventual deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

98. The challenges in the Central African Republic are immense and multifaceted. The response to the crisis must be comprehensive, multidimensional and sustained in order to help stabilize the country, restore law and order and rebuild State institutions that can secure the country and protect the people. This is not the first time that the United Nations will have deployed peacekeepers in the Central African Republic. As the lessons learned from the past clearly demonstrate, the United Nations must, in order to have an impact on the ground, be given a strong role. This includes supporting the reforms needed to address the root causes of the crisis and helping to rebuild the State and its institutions so that the Central African Republic can finally break free from the recurring cycle of political instability, violence and poverty. The United Nations mission foresees strong and close cooperation with the World Bank, the African Development Bank and other financial institutions in rebuilding the Central African Republic.

99. The peacekeeping mission, whose main goals and tasks are outlined in the present report, would be tailored to the circumstances on the ground. Its military footprint would decrease as soon as the situation permits, while its police component would gradually increase. Its civilian staffing would be flexibly managed on the basis of priority tasks, which would also evolve in response to the situation on the ground.

100. We must recognize that there will be no quick fix in the Central African Republic. Responding to the crisis will require time and resources. The scale of the needs in the country is daunting. Progress in any one area will not be sustainable without significant and simultaneous engagement in other areas. Further postponement of a sustainable multidimensional response may well carry even greater human and financial costs. The potential division of the country along sectarian lines and the creation of a fertile breeding ground for extremist groups are real risks, with potentially far-reaching implications for the stability of the region and beyond.

101. There will be no solution to the crisis in the Central African Republic without the continued active engagement of the country's neighbours and the region. I call on them and the wider international community to increase their efforts in support of the Central African Republic, taking into account their respective comparative advantages, while seeking to leverage partnerships and regional initiatives.

102. A strong MISCA will help address the immediate security challenges faced by the population and facilitate the transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation. MISCA, however, still lacks critical capabilities to achieve its full potential. I call on bilateral partners and Member States to urgently provide MISCA with rapid and generous financial and material support, including for the payment of its personnel and for the reimbursement of major military equipment.

103. I recommend that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorize the deployment of a multidimensional

United Nations peacekeeping operation whose mandate is in line with the recommendations contained in paragraphs 60 and 61 and with adequate resources. The aim would be for the bulk of MISCA to transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, along with other contributors in accordance with the human rights screening policy and capabilities, in order to reach an authorized strength of 10,000 military personnel, including 240 military observers and 200 staff officers, and up to 1,820 civilian police officers, with 10 formed police units comprising 1,400 formed police unit personnel, 400 individual police officers and 20 seconded corrections officers. These would be deployed together with a significant civilian component and necessary support staff. This strength would be reviewed on a regular basis, leading to appropriate recommendations to the Council. With the establishment of the peacekeeping operation, BINUCA would cease to exist.

104. Many of the problems facing the Central African Republic exceed the capacities of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, considering the complexities of the crisis, the absence of the security apparatus and the almost non-existent capacity of the State. Deploying a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic should therefore be part of a broader long-term engagement of the international community. Success in this broader effort to help the Government and people of the Central African Republic to rebuild a State will depend on the contributions and commitments of many actors, most importantly Central Africans themselves.

105. In addition to the Government's request for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, its deployment must come with a political commitment from national stakeholders to engage in an inclusive political process aimed at creating an environment that is conducive to the creation of a new army; the rebuilding of the police and the gendarmerie; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts; reconciliation; and the conduct of inclusive, fair and transparent elections. The mission's deployment should be used as an opportunity to review the transitional framework in an inclusive manner. National actors should commit formally to a process that produces a consensual vision for a future republican army that is representative of the nation's diversity. They should also consider strengthening international mechanisms, such as the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic and the technical follow-up committee, which could be given additional scope to facilitate the transition process, with an important role for key regional and international actors, as well as the United Nations, and could function as an international committee to accompany the transition.

106. The international community must commit to working together and to providing to the Central African Republic the assistance necessary to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of our actions, based on our respective comparative advantages. There can be no development without peace, no peace without development and neither without respect for human rights and the rule of law. Adequate resources must be devoted to each of those pillars. Our common long-term objective must be a Central African Republic that is secure in its borders, able to conduct its own affairs and provide services to all Central Africans without discrimination and without interference from or dependence on outsiders, where Muslims, Christians and other communities can live peacefully alongside each other, regardless of creed or political affiliation, and play a vibrant role in the political, economic and social life of the country.

107. The deployment of the proposed peacekeeping operation would need, in particular, to go hand in hand with a commitment of the international financial institutions to support the rebuilding of the State, which would include support to rebuilding the financial and banking sectors, including the payment of salaries to civil servants in the immediate term.

108. At the same time, I recommend that a partnership initiative be established between the Government of the Central African Republic and the international community, including the African Union and ECCAS, which would set out key priorities for a recovery and accountability compact based on critical peace and State-building goals. In particular, it will be necessary to strengthen public financial management and accountability in a manner that specifically targets revenue collection, expenditure controls, public procurement and concession practices as part of the rebuilding of the State, along the lines of the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme in Liberia.

109. Given the dire conditions and extreme vulnerability of the population, immediate and sustained support for humanitarian operations is equally important. Urgent measures are needed to hold accountable perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law violations.

110. I wish to pay tribute to my Special Representative for the Central African Republic, Babacar Gaye, and the staff of BINUCA and the United Nations country team for their continued hard work. I am deeply appreciative of the sacrifice that they are making for the cause of peace in the Central African Republic. I also thank the transitional authorities, the African Union, MISCA troop-contributing countries, ECCAS, the European Union, donor countries and multilateral and non-governmental organizations for their continued efforts to address the crisis in the Central African Republic. We must build on the sense of hope that the Central African people are exhibiting to enhance our partnership and redouble our efforts in support of the people and Government of the Central African Republic.

United Nations S/2014/143

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 March 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instruction from my Government and with reference to the letter dated 10 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2014/90) and the letter dated 10 September 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2013/538), I have the honour to state the following:

The Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects the unfounded and unacceptable claims regarding the Iranian islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb and the Lesser Tunb in the Persian Gulf, and reiterates its consistent and principled position that it does not recognize the existence of any dispute between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates, the three islands having been an inseparable part of Iranian territory. Thus, and as has been regularly reiterated, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran over the said islands are not negotiable. Nonetheless, and to show its utmost respect for the principle of good neighbourliness, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always expressed its readiness to talk with the United Arab Emirates with a view to continuing to strengthen bilateral relations and removing any misunderstanding that may exist between the two countries.

I would also like to stress that "Persian Gulf" is the only true geographical designation for the body of water lying between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Arabian Peninsula, and has been used from the dawn of history. As the institutional memory of all renowned cartographic agencies testifies, this sea area has always been identified as the Persian Gulf. In this context, the policy of the United Nations and its practice of emphasizing the use of the correct name, "Persian Gulf", as the only geographical designation applicable to this body of water are noteworthy and should therefore be respected by all. Accordingly, any use of fabricated names for this body of water, including the fabricated name used in both of the above-mentioned letters, is not acceptable and must be stopped.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammad **Khazaee**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-25160 (E) 040314

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United Nations S/2014/144

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 March 2014
English
Original: French

Letter dated 1 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of Luxembourg, the Security Council will hold an open debate on "Children and armed conflict" on 7 March 2014. The objective of the open debate will be to encourage reflection on ways and means to make progress towards the full implementation of the children and armed conflict agenda.

In order to help steer the discussion on the subject, Luxembourg has prepared a concept note (see annex). I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Sylvie **Lucas**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-25116 (E) 050314 050314

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Annex to the letter dated 1 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Luxembourg to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and French]

Concept Note

Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict

Towards the full implementation of the agenda

[7 March 2014]

In the context of its presidency of the Security Council, Luxembourg will organize an open debate on Children and Armed Conflict on 7 March 2014. The objective of the open debate will be to encourage reflection on ways and means to make progress towards the full implementation of the "Children and Armed Conflict" agenda. The adoption of a new resolution on this issue is foreseen on this occasion.

Background

Fifteen years have passed since the adoption of resolution 1261 (1999), the first resolution specifically dedicated to children and armed conflict. Since then, this issue has been developed considerably, with the gradual establishment of a framework which has contributed to the liberation of thousands of children from armed forces and groups. While it was initially focused on the phenomenon of child soldiers, the agenda has evolved in a progressive manner, taking into account the widespread impact of conflicts on children and the variety of violations committed against them. In its resolution 1612 (2005), the Security Council thus enumerated six categories of violations — the six grave violations — which are used to gather evidence of violations committed against children. In parallel, the Security Council took note in that resolution of the establishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism, which has a central place in the United Nations framework, together with the child protection advisers. It is this mechanism that is responsible for collecting and providing timely, objective, accurate and reliable information on the six grave violations committed against children in armed conflict.

This information is essential for the work of the Security Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, in order to ensure respect for international norms on child protection, to hold parties to account and to bring them to end and prevent violations against children. Concrete and time-bound action plans are a unique tool in this regard. The conflict parties listed in the annexes to the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict must elaborate and implement such action plans without delay, in collaboration with the United Nations. To date, 18 action plans have been signed between armed forces and groups and the United Nations.

Nevertheless, despite the undeniable success on the ground, which has been achieved through the joint efforts of Governments, the United Nations, the international community as a whole and civil society, tens of thousands of children continue to be recruited, killed or maimed, sexually abused or deprived of their right

to education and health care when schools and hospitals are attacked. As conflicts erupt, new parties appear on the lists of the annexes to the Secretary-General's report. Furthermore, 28 parties out of the 52 that are listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General's annual report on children and armed conflict meet the definition of persistent perpetrators, having been listed for at least five years.

Towards the full implementation of the agenda

The political will of the concerned States to end and prevent violations against children remains the precondition for any effective action.

However, political will alone is not enough. In order to protect children affected by armed conflict, human, financial and technical capacities must be commensurate with the needs on the ground. Capacity-building, including for the fight against impunity, thus plays an important role in the effective implementation of child protection measures. It is also imperative to mobilize sufficient resources for a sustainable and timely financing of the implementation of the action plans and related monitoring measures.

The dark chapter of child recruitment and use by Government forces can and must be closed. This objective seems within reach today. Indeed, the concerned Governments have clearly manifested their political will to protect children. This momentum, which encompasses both concerned parties and the international community, must be galvanized in order to allow for the full implementation of the "Children and Armed Conflict" agenda, from prevention to reintegration. The "Children, Not Soldiers" campaign of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children by Government armed forces in conflict by 2016 aims to support this momentum. The campaign should mobilize the international community in order to accompany the concerned Governments in their efforts to comply with their international obligations. At the same time, we must not lose sight of the need to also mobilize efforts to end the recruitment and use of children by armed groups.

To prevent children from being recruited in the first place, a number of preventive measures can be envisaged, ranging from the establishment of a legal framework with provisions for the protection of children to the establishment of an age verification mechanism in recruitment procedures. Birth registration and birth certificates are also effective preventive measures. In parallel, in the context of security and justice sector reform, the development of investigative and prosecution capacities as well as the exclusion from amnesty laws of perpetrators of crimes against children would certainly have a deterrent effect and contribute to ending impunity for these crimes. Supporting national efforts, the United Nations should ensure that priority is given to issues concerning children affected by armed conflict in plans, programmes and strategies for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.

Training and capacity-building for the personnel responsible for child protection in the field are of capital importance. In the context of peacekeeping operations, blue helmets are often the first to be confronted with children affected by armed conflict. The fate of these children depends to a large extent on the peacekeepers' capacity to manage this situation correctly. Therefore, peacekeepers must be given specific operational pre-deployment and in-mission training to enable them to tackle such situations and to make the right decisions.

Child protection advisers also have a central role to play in peacekeeping operations, peacebuilding missions and special political missions. They must be deployed in a consistent manner and the child protection capacities of the different missions must be reinforced.

Regional and subregional organizations and arrangements have a valuable contribution to make for the promotion and protection of children. This contribution deserves to be explored further and strengthened.

New challenges

In many conflict-affected countries throughout the world, national armed forces or armed groups use schools for military purposes, with negative consequences for children and their right to education. If schools are turned into barracks, into detention centres, into military training camps, into weapons depots or into military operations bases, they become legitimate military targets, putting the pupils in grave danger. In any event, the use of schools for military purposes deprives children of their legitimate right to education. This problem is often underestimated because it does not as such represent a violation of international humanitarian law. It is however a major challenge and merits consideration.

Issues for consideration

In the context of the open debate, Member States are invited to consider the following non-exhaustive list of questions:

- How can the concerned States best be supported to strengthen their capacity to protect children?
- How can the "Children, Not Soldiers" campaign of UNICEF and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict best be supported?
- How can action plans be financed in both a flexible and predictable manner?
- What complementary role can regional and subregional organizations and arrangements play in the implementation of the "Children and Armed Conflict" agenda?
- What measures implemented at the national level for the protection of school infrastructures could be used as examples and best practices to replicate elsewhere?
- How can impunity be fought and perpetrators of grave violations against children brought to justice?

Participation and briefers

The open debate will be held at ministerial level and will be chaired by the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, Jean Asselborn. The Secretary-General, the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, the Executive Director of UNICEF, and Mr. Alhaji Babah Sawaneh, who was abducted and forced to fight as a child soldier with the rebel forces in Sierra Leone, will brief the Council. The meeting will be open to the participation of non-Security Council members.

United Nations S/2014/145

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 March 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Ms. Fiona Allan-Smith has been appointed alternate representative of the United Kingdom on the Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

14-25129 (E) 040314

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United Nations S/2014/146

Security Council

Distr.: General
3 March 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 3 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a statement by the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, dated 1 March 2014 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Vitaly **Churkin**

14-25261 (E) 040314 040314

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Annex to the letter dated 3 March 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the President of Ukraine

As the legally elected President of Ukraine, I hereby make the following statement.

The events on the Maidan and the illegal seizure of power in Kyiv have brought Ukraine to the brink of civil war. Chaos and anarchy reign in the country, and people' s lives, safety and human rights are under threat, particularly in the south-east and in Crimea. With the influence of Western countries, open acts of terror and violence are being perpetrated and people are being persecuted on political and linguistic grounds.

I therefore appeal to the President of Russia, V. V. Putin, to use the armed forces of the Russian Federation to restore law and order, peace and stability and to protect the people of Ukraine.

(*Signed*) V. F. **Yanukovych**